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Russian World, Pan-Turkism and EU Normative Power in Gagauz Yeri: Competing 
Geopolitical Ideologies and Regional Identity at the Sub-state Level 
Rusif Huseynov 
 
Abstract 
The current state of Gagauzia, a territorial autonomy within Moldova since the 1990s, 
reflects its troubled historical past and geographical location. Located at the crossroads 
of geopolitical interests, Gagauzia even today is subject to geopolitical influence of 
various power sources, as the interests of Turkey, Russia and the European Union 
converge in the region. This competition can be best reflected as a struggle of geopolitical 
ideologies emitted by Turkey (Pan-Turkism), Russia (Russian world) and the European 
Union (EU normative power), which are certainly interested in either shaping their 
international milieu or bringing the adjacent regions into their sphere of influence. 
The major aim of this research is to find out the post-2014 elitar narrative in Gagauzia 
toward each geopolitical ideology. The relevant Self and Other narrative of Gagauz 
political, cultural and intellectual figures shapes not only contemporary Gagauz identity, 
but also which region(s) they belong to, which geopolitical civilization(s) they feel 
ascribed to, which external actors are constructed as their closest allies and enemies and 
where they see their future. 
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1.  Introduction  
1.1. Research object 
Gagauzia or Gagauz Yeri in the local language is a small autonomous region in southern 
Moldova. Established in its present form in 1995 and formally known as the Autonomous 
Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, the entity covers 1,832 km2 and is divided into three dolays 
(districts) in four enclaves. Out of 155,600, which make up 4.6% of Moldova`s 
population, the Gagauz constitute the absolute majority (82.1%) and are followed by 
Bulgarians, Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians1. 
Orthodox Christians by faith and Oghuz Turks by language, the titular ethnic group of 
the autonomy, the Gagauz, migrated to the present-day Moldova and Ukraine in the late 
18th century and early 19th century. Since then the core group has lived under the Russian 
Empire, the Kingdom of Romania, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Moldova.  
Decades of Russification and Sovietisation, the weak development of the Gagauz 
language and the multi-ethnic nature of Bessarabia have all contributed to the 
construction of the Gagauz identity. Underdeveloped during the Soviet time, Gagauz 
national consciousness, nevertheless, underwent an awakening at the close of the 1980s 
and claimed a separate ethno-territorial entity.  
Unlike other ethno-territorial problems that broke out as violent and bloody conflicts with 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the Gagauz movement for self-determination in the early 
1990s proceeded relatively peacefully. After a few years of de facto independence 
Gagauzia once again opted for a peaceable way and negotiations during its reintegration 
into Moldova in the mid-1990s.  
The region currently experiences multiple problems internally (poor protection of the 
Gagauz language and culture, weak infrastructure, unemployment, out-migration, etc.), 
while its relations with the central authorities in Chişinau have usually been uneasy.  
The contemporary state of Gagauzia reflects its troubled historical past and geographical 
location. Having historically lived in a border region various empires fought for and 
treated as geopolitically important, the Gagauz are still subject to geopolitical influence 
                                                          
1 Information about the population of Gagauzia. Accessed on May 13, 2019. 
http://www.gagauzia.md/pageview.php?l=ru&idc=363&nod=1&  
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of diverse power sources. They share ethnolinguistic connections with Turkey, while 
maintaining strong historical and present-day affiliation with Russia. With Moldova`s 
desire to drift westward and the European Union`s (EU) advance into the region, 
Gagauzia has been a recipient of European influence, too. Gagauz regional belonging is 
designed within such a complicated context. 
 
1.2. Statement of the research puzzle  
Caught in a tangled web of influences and given the weakness of Moldova, Gagauzia, as 
a receiver of external soft power initiatives, finds itself in the middle of territorial and 
ideological rivalries amongst big powers. Three mighty entities, Russia, Turkey and the 
EU, are in the process of constantly strengthening their influence on Gagauzia. This 
influence is exerted in the form of geopolitical ideologies: Russian world, Pan-Turkism 
and EU normative power.  
Since the early 1990s Turkey has been a major donor to the region, by referring to 
linguistic and ethnic ties with the Gagauz and identifying the latter as a brother nation. 
Impressive are construction and development projects conducted by Turkish party, 
especially via Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), a governmental 
agency. Russia, in her turn, relies more on the influence of the Russian language and 
historical memory in Gagauzia. Moreover, Gagauz Orthodoxy, just like the Moldovan 
Church, is under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. After the 2014 referendum2 
in Gagauzia, the European Union began paying more attention to the region. The EU has 
launched several multi-million-dollar projects (good governance, civil society, youth 
development, etc.) specifically aimed at the autonomy. Moreover, governments and 
NGOs of EU member-states do also carry out certain policies (infrastructure projects, 
citizenship, etc.) in regard with Gagauzia.  
It is also substantial to explore Gagauz regional identity and how this small community, 
which has historically been ruled by bigger groups, ascribes itself to a particular region 
or geopolitical sphere in light of the rivalry of the afore-mentioned ideologies. 
                                                          
2 The referendum in Gagauzia that took place on February 2, 2014 was to determine the entity`s foreign 
policy priorities. More information on the referendum is provided in Chapter 4. 
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Ethnolinguistic affiliation (ethnic kinship with Turks, Russian as a bridge language in the 
region), historical narratives (allegiance towards Russia, the painful Romanian period, 
Soviet nostalgia), complex geopolitical position (the crossroads of the Russia, Turkey and 
EU), incomplete national consciousness and out-migration (guest workers in Russia and 
Turkey, as well as in the EU to some extent) further puzzle the situation and serve as 
factors that influence the regional belonging of Gagauzia, which may be different from 
that of the parent state.  
Voiced by a local student to James Kapaló (2011: 82) during the latter`s ethnographic 
research in the region, the quote “The Turks want to turn us into Turks, the Bulgarians 
into Bulgarians, the Russians into Russians, the Moldovans into Romanians and now the 
Greeks want to try the same. Why don’t they just let us be Gagauz!” can illustrate the 
desperate attempts of the Gagauz in seeking their identity and associating it with a certain 
region, as well as the efforts of the external forces.  
 
1.3. Aims and objectives  
As there exists a paucity of literature on how geopolitical ideologies influence regional 
identity at sub-state level in general, and on Gagauz identity in a geopolitical context in 
particular, this thesis, therefore, aims to seek answers to the following research questions:  
1. How do three geopolitical ideologies compete in Gagauzia?  
2. How do the geopolitical ideologies shape Gagauz regional identity and how are they 
reflected in Gagauz narrative about belonging to “different worlds”?  
3. How does the competition of geopolitical ideologies affect the Moldovan state? 
The textual bodyof the thesis is structured in six chapters. The introduction that provides 
the statement of the research puzzle, announces the main objectives of the study and 
reports about the existing literature. This part is followed by the theoretical framework 
that explains the examined concepts, regional identity and geopolitical ideology, and 
provides descriptions of each geopolitical ideology, Russian world, Pan-Turkism and EU 
normative power. Chapter 3 comprises research methodology and data collection process 
the author has used for this work. After the background information (history and current 
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situation of Gagauzia) comes the empirical part that analyses contemporary Gagauz 
identity and Gagauz narrative on each geopolitical ideology, as well as on the parent state, 
Moldova. The thesis ends with the conclusion, list of bibliography and appendices.  
This research can hopefully contribute to the general literature on Gagauzia, which is 
relatively understudied in academia. The work scrutinizes several interesting issues both 
theoretically and practically: drawing out relationships between geopolitical ideology and 
regional identity at sub-state level in the context of Gagauzia, Gagauz identity and 
external affiliation vis-à-vis outside geopolitical influences is examined through local 
elitar narratives.  
Moreover, the research presumably provides a new dimension to the concept of regional 
identity by looking into it through geopolitical lenses as opposed to the context of 
economic development and EU regionalism usually preferred by scholarship. The term 
‘geopolitical ideology’ is also extensively used and explained in this work: by applying a 
civilizational approach, three specific conceptions (Russian world, Pan-Turkism and EU 
normative power) are not only described, but also examined through their influences on 
the studied region.   
In addition to the theoretical weight of the thesis, the author expects that the findings can 
be more effective if employed in practice: different actors that belong to and/or channel 
certain geopolitical ideologies can review the current situation and (re-)devise their 
respective policies toward Gagauzia.  
 
1.4. Overview of the existing literature  
Although the first ethnographic works on the Gagauz appeared in the closing years of the 
19th century (Russian ethnogapher V. A. Moshkov) and developed in the first half of the 
20th century (Gagauz priest and enlightener M. Çakir), the biggest portion of the relevant 
literature is the product of the contemporary age.  
The major works on Gagauz history were written by Angeli (2006; 2007), Tufar et al. 
(2015) among others. Kendighelean`s (2009) and Topal`s (2013) memoirs also shed light, 
albeit subjectively, on the specific period of Gagauz history, namely the Gagauz Republic 
11 
 
and formation of the current Gagauz autonomy. Printed in Russian and available in small 
quantities, the noted books were accessed by the author in the Comrat Atatürk Library.  
Among the Western scholars, Kapaló (2010, 2011) has made an extensive ethnographic 
research on Gagauzia: his works primarily focus on religious practices and traditions of 
the Gagauz. Moreover, Menz (2007), Katchanovski (2005), Demirdirek (2000; 2006) 
have touched upon linguistic particularities and historical memory in the region, as well 
as sense of belonging and claims over a certain territory. The Gagauz national movement 
and its relations with the Moldovan government during the 1990s have been researched 
by numerous scholars, including King (1997), Chinn & Roper (1998), Zabarah (2012). 
The 2014 referendum raised more interest in Gagauzia: Kosienkowski (2017a, b), 
Schlegel (2018) re-examined the political and statehood aspects of the Gagauz autonomy, 
with the latter also revising them through geopolitical dimension. Several post-2014 
articles (Bitkova, 2015; Donaj & Grishin, 2015; Tislenko, 2015) discuss the Gagauz 
autonomy in the context of the geopolitical struggle of Russia, Turkey and the EU.  
A remarkable work was a Master of Arts thesis on Gagauzia presented recently at the 
University of Tartu. An etnographic research defended by Christiana Holsapple in 2018 
contributes a lot to understanding of Gagauz identity 
Although the study of Gagauz regional identity, especially against the background of 
geopolitical influences and struggles has been very limited, numerous analytical articles 
appeared in media outlets especially in the aftermath of the 2014 referendum. The event 
that coincided with the Crimean events further generated interest in this small region, its 
geopolitical orientation and even its secessionist potential: Gagauzia`s being at the 
crossroads, its relations with Moldova, as well as Gagauzia as a stage for the outside 
influences (Russia, Turkey, EU) have been discussed on several international platforms 
(New Eastern Europe, Al Jazeera, FPRI, DW, etc.). 
The author himself benefitted from and referred to scholarly articles, analytical pieces 
and news mainly in English and Russian, as well as, in Turkish, Azerbaijani, Gagauz and 
even Bulgarian to some extent. The academic literature in Gagauz is almost non-existent, 
but several Gagauz-language textbooks were also examined during the research.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. The concept of regional identity 
By referring to the case of Gagauzia, this thesis seeks to detect how geopolitical ideology 
may influence regional identity. Primarily, it should be clarified that while the term 
‘region’ may “refer to both sub- and supra-state units” and may be “conceptualised at 
various spatial scales” (Paasi, 2009: 122), this paper examines the region at a sub-state 
level, given Gagauzia`s current situation within Moldovan framework.  
As a significant aspect for turning regions into “social and political spaces” (Paasi, 2009: 
137-138), regional identity is seen by Zimmerbauer & Paasi (2013: 32) as an emotive 
phenomenon connected with regional consciousness and expressed in a sense of 
belonging to a specific region. A form of collective identity, regional identity is a social 
and discursive construct, not a pre-determined cultural phenomenon; it is rather 
constructed “through, in and against, cultural and political institutions, social movements 
and processes of governance” (Tomaney, 2007: 357), as a result of the activities of certain 
groups (e.g., regionalists), who set borders, construct symbols and (re-)intepret (hi)stories 
(Semian & Chromý, 2014: 264). 
Regional identity consists of a material base (e.g., nature, culture, economic system) and 
a mental sphere or images (Paasi, 1986: 130). According to another classification, 
regional identity comprises two components: cultural-historical and political-economic 
(Paasi, 2009: 141), while Semian & Chromý (2014: 264) point to regional identity 
(consciousness) of the residents and the identity (image) of a region as two separate, 
interlinked and mutually supplementary components (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework of regional identity (Semian & Chromý, 2014: 264) 
 
A sense of affiliation with a certain community within a specific territory, regional 
consciousness or self-understanding differs ‘us’ from ‘them’, other regions and groups. 
Based on common identification and reproduced through socialization, such a collective 
dimension of regional identity consists of personal world outlooks of each member and 
of ideas shared by all group members (Paasi, 1986: 132; Paasi, 2009: 139-140). Besides, 
this collective identity may be constructed as a regional image either from within (by its 
own residents) or from outside (by others beyond the region) (Paasi, 1986: 137).  
Regional identity has been studied especially within the framework of regional 
development and the EU`s ‘new European regionalism’, which means new contexts and 
meanings for European regions. In this regard, internal potential and resources, which 
influence and are influenced by regional identity, help to elaborate regional development 
strategies. This phenomenon is, therefore, scrutinized and viewed as an important factor, 
which cannot only push but also be an obstacle to regional development process (Semian 
and Chromý, 2014: 264).  
Holding a central role in institutionalization of certain territories, regional identity, just 
like region itself and borders, is a process, which is constructed, institutionalized, changed 
and terminated by regional institutions and communities (Vainikka, 2012: 2, 8; 
Zimmerbauer & Paasi, 2013: 31). As elaborated by Passi (1986: 121; 2009: 134-136), the 
institutionalization of regions as a socio-spatial process develop through four phases, 
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during which territorial, symbolic and institutional figuration is completed with the role 
assigned for the region. While all these phases are significant and influence each other, it 
is usually the fourth one that provides the region with its own identity. 
Regional identity can be interpreted and influenced differently by varied agencies 
connected with the area: political circles are engaged to establish or strengthen their 
power; business sector is concerned about ensuring and/or growing their economic profit; 
cultural activists are interested in preserving and reviving local peculiarities (Semian & 
Chromý, 2014: 265). 
Ridanpää (2015: 67) brings attention to “the storied nature of regional identity”, as the 
latter is created and receives a meaning through human imagination. Meanwhile Tomaney 
(2007: 355) claims that collective identity relies on “discourses to which intellectuals, 
cultural producers, and political leaders contribute”.  
Regional identity of ethnic minorities can be interesting to study, as their narrative may 
be designed and/or translated as alternative to the national or dominant narrative; this 
way, ethnic minorities may try to retain their distinctive nature and resist the majority-led 
subjugation policy (Prokkola & Ridanpää, 2011: 779).  
 
2.1.1. Gagauz regional identity 
Our case stems from regional identity of an ethnic minority within a nation-state. The 
author is more interested to explore how identity-building regional narrative of the local 
elite (by referring to Tomaney`s (2007: 355) afore-mentioned argument) may (by 
countering national narrative) ascribe the focal ethnic minority to an outside source of 
power (geopolitical ideology), driven by kinship, affiliation, economic development 
and/or other incentives.  
According to Kapalό (2011: 77-78), Gagauz identity is a result of geographical, historical, 
political and social factors, including post-Soviet existential challenges. It was 
constructed by emulating discourses, which have “instrumentalised and mythologised 
narratives of ethnogenesis, origins and religious destiny”.  
15 
 
Analyzing the complicated Gagauz identity, Tislenko (2015: 72) refers to three 
interwinned components that compose this identity:  
1) The autochthonous component is signified through the Gagauz language, as well as 
self-governance and national symbols. Yet, Tislenko`s explanation on the endangered 
state of the native idiom due to demographic, not cultural factors, can be challenged. The 
linguistic and cultural expansion of outside forces, especially Russian, plays a crucial role 
in undermining the situation of Gagauz since the latter is usually overshadowed and not 
fully developed as an administrative, academical or “higher society” tongue.  
2) Next to the autochthonous component is the Russian language, which plays an 
important role in the region both as an administrative, education and religion language, 
having transformed the Gagauz “from largely illiterate monoglot speakers of a Turki[c] 
idiom” (Kapalό, 2011: 82) into a current bilingual ethnic group. Another noteworthy sub-
element of Russianness is the Soviet nostalgia (e.g., the collective memory about the 
Great Patriotic War). While the Gagauz had converted to Ortodoxy long before they fell 
under Russian influence, their church is presently subject to the Moscow Patriarchate and 
liturgic sermons in the Gagauz churches are conducted in Russian. 
3) The third component is the Turkic kinship: despite controversial theories on the Gagauz 
ethnogenesis, the community of blood and language contributes to the emergence of 
identity-building myths among both ordinary people and professional historians. The 
Turkic component also gave strong impetus to and helped to legitimize the autonomy 
claims of the Gagauz, as well as their relations with Turkey and other Turkic states. 
Gagauz regional identity has also been influenced by their status of being a minority: for 
centuries, this community has been an ethnic and linguistic minority in Bessarabia, a 
region dominated by Romanian- and Slavic-speakers. In a vast Turkic world, which the 
Gagauz ethnically and linguistically belong to, they find themselves as a religious 
minority among the Muslims (Kapaló, 2011: 5). Furthermore, as a double minority, an 
ethnic minority living within a non-Russian republic, in the former Soviet Union, the 
Gagauz could not effectively develop their own language, education, bureaucracy and 
therefore, “are slower in the process of downsizing the Soviet imagination” (Demirdirek, 
2000: 72). Therefore, the initial attempts for the Gagauz autonomy were to resist the 
hegemony of the Moldovan identity, “by embracing the Russian language and Soviet 
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heritage on the one hand” (Demirdirek, 2006: 45) and by constructing a Gagauz national 
identity on the other. Moreover, in spite of centuries-long subjection, Gagauz identity 
itself is not discriminative as its byzantine nature is filled with tolerance and co-existence 
with other ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic region. 
Gagauz regional identity arose as an interesting question in the aftermath of the 2014 
referendum. It can be claimed that the plebiscite outcomes plainly demonstrated 
Gagauzia`s willingness not to become a part of the EU and to join the Russia-led 
integrationist project instead. However, this theme is yet to be further explored: regions 
change and develop, and so do regional identities (since they are not fixed and unchanging 
as noted by Prokkola & Ridanpää (2011: 778)) owing to endegenous processes (political, 
economic, cultural developments, etc.) and external influences (foreign aid, trade, 
remittances, etc.). In other words, each year that distances us from the referendum may 
mean shifts in perceptions of the population and leadership due to internal developments 
and growing influence of other geopolitical actors.  
Moreover, given the “dominant paradigm in regionalist studies which treats the region as 
an imagined community and a would-be nation in miniature” (Brigevich, 2016: 483), to 
what extent regional identity narratives may lead Gagauzia`s future self-determination 
can also be reviewed in order to understand what future path the region may embrace. 
While regional identity is usually examined for regional development, branding / 
marketing, as well as cultural discourse (Zimmerbauer & Passi, 2013: 32), this 
phenomenon is handled as a contested field for geopolitical competition in the thesis.  
Therefore, Gagauz regional identity, which is subject to geopolitical influences at least 
from three directions, must firstly concern the locals, as the certainty in this matter can 
help the region to formulate its development and foreign policy strategy. Such a clarity 
would also be important for both Moldova and geopolitical powers, too, for designing 
their respective policies toward Gagauzia.  
The analytical part of the thesis offers an insight into how Gagauz regional identity is 
constructed in local elite`s narratives. 
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2.2. The concept of geopolitical ideology 
Not frequently used in literature, the concept ‘geopolitical ideology’ can be 
conceptualized as a set of policies (political, economic, cultural, etc.) by one center to 
gain power over territory and resources.  
Although there have been claims about the end of geopolitics in the post-Cold War era 
(Tunjic, 1999: 90; Peter, 1999), competition for power over territory and resources has 
not yet ended. While the liberal discourse points to “geopolitics as an anachronistic 
practice” (Toal, 2017: 21) that aggressive great powers use to challenge liberal order and 
values, the realist story asserts that geopolitical practices are important as all great powers 
concern about security in their neighborhoods. The political-geographic struggle of 
international actors “for spreading national, state or bloc interests” in order to obtain 
“political, economic and military power”, influence and control (Tunjic, 1999: 92) over 
physical territories, human and mineral resources, as well as other values does still take 
place, thus, keeping geopolitical thinking alive.  
Toal (2017: 39-40) and O’Loughlin et al. (2005: 324) offer the term ‘geopolitical culture’, 
which may refer to “the identity of a territorial entity and the locational narrative it 
presents to itself and the world” (Toal, 2017: 39). This concept possesses ideological 
power alongside economic and security power networks, while geopolitical culture`s 
ideological aspect generates the civilizational (identity) form of geopolitical thinking.  
Geopolitical cultures are constructed through state institutions, historical experiences, 
geographical specifications, relevant identity formations, geopolitical traditions and 
imaginations. Geographical traditions (high culture) and imaginations (low culture) about 
Self and Other are important images and discourses that draw the boundaries of identity 
and difference of particular civilizations (O`Loughlin et al., 2005: 324). In other words, 
geopolitical culture defines the geopolitical actor`s “sense of identity, place, and mission 
in the world” (Toal, 2017: 39-40).  
The scenario forecasted for the post-Cold War era, in the form of the clash of civilizations, 
may also work as inter-civilizational geopolitics, which may shape struggles or dialogues 
among several civilizations (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2011: 180-181). They serve as sources of 
influence and soft power policies, which can be summarized as ideologies for this context. 
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As self-contained entities, civilizations are essentially ideological; thus, the ideological 
values they offer both for their domestic population and external targets shape dynamics 
inside and among civilizations.  
Throughout the text the author tends to use the phrase ‘geopolitical ideology,’ which, in 
his thinking, best fits for the three concepts discussed, analyzed and compared in this 
thesis. The producers of geopolitical ideologies in this context are broader civilizations 
and geopolitical realms that include and are represented by post-Westphalian states and 
supranational entities, as well as different non-governmental organizations. As 
civilizational approach is employed in this geopolitical system, the three ideologies may 
represent and/or overlap with the following civilizations: Russian world as part of 
Eurasianism, EU normative power as part of Europe / West / trans-Atlanticism, Pan-
Turkism as part of Orientalism / Islam. The following sub-chapters present some 
information on each geopolitical ideology. 
 
2.2.1. The Russian world  
The Russian world or Russkiy mir is a polysemous, fluid and ambiguous concept, which 
can echo “the ancient perception of a shared civilizational space” (Laruelle, 2015: 3). The 
term ‘Russian world’ can be explained as part of close conceptions that define the post-
Soviet space as a region of specifically important to Russia’s interests, such as “the near 
abroad,” “historical space of Russia”, “the space of Russian language”, and “the territory 
of Russia’s responsibility” (O`Loughlin et al., 2017: 7). 
The ideological conceptualization of the Russian world has evolved since the 1990s, 
when the active search for post-Soviet Russia`s self-definition, geopolitical place and 
ideology was underway and became influenced by a number of factors, including 
diminished territory, up to 25 million ethnic Russians outside of the Russian Federation, 
ethno-territorial conflicts and geopolitical powers advancing into Russia`s Near Abroad. 
Since then the ideology has taken different forms: revanchist irredentism, confrontational 
and isolationist visions, as well as a moderate and radical soft power instrument. 
The present term of the Russian world was conceptualized and developed by Petr 
Shchedrovitsky and Gleb Pavlovsky in the 1990s (Polegkyi, 2011: 15; Laruelle, 2015: 3; 
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Suslov, 2018: 334). According to the former (2000a), “The Russian world is a network 
structure of large and small communities that think and speak Russian”, while the latter 
claims, “Russia remains a specific civilization, which masters all civilizations with its 
concise complexity, permeability, and powerful vocal and intellectual capacity that 
appeals to all human beings.” (Laruelle, 2015: 4).  
In their 1999 article, Shchedrovitsky and Ostrovsky elaborated on their definition, 
referring to a peaceful reestablishment of Russia’s identity and its reconnection with its 
past and its diasporas, as well as proposing a “progressive empire” rather than 
“aggressive”. They also emphasized a shared destiny, along with the Russian language, 
for Russians. In his turn, Polegkyi (2011: 16-18) presents three cornerstones that construct 
the Russian world: Russian language, Orthodox church and historical memory. 
O`Loughlin et al. (2017: 5) distinguish three “interconnected sets of meaning”: 
linguistic/cultural, biopolitical, and spiritual. According to both Putin (2018) and 
Nikonov (2017), one of the main proponents of the Russian world concept, Russianness 
is based mostly on the spiritual affiliation with Russia (mainly Russian language, as well 
as culture and history), not on ethnicity or Orthodoxy. 
In its initial, depoliticized meaning as a cultural and linguistic realm, the Russian world 
could be understood as a cultural sphere of the Russian language and its products. Just 
like the Francophone world which extends beyond France’s borders, the Russian world 
appears as a community of a shared spoken language and culture. A language-centric 
definition, however, is unavoidably entangled with the geopolitical situation of Russian 
compatriots (sootechestvenniki) abroad. Both ethnicity and cultural/linguistic dimensions 
form the main core of the Russian world, ethnic Russians and Russophones, a community, 
which, according to Suslov (2017: 3), “outside Russia has been ideologically constructed 
and politically instrumentalized by the Kremlin’s leadership.”  
The term ‘compatriots’ came to its present meaning in the early 1990s with the new 
geopolitical order and the sense of responsibility to those beyond Russia’s borders who 
looked to the country as a cultural hearth and for protection (O`Loughlin et al., 2017: 5; 
Suslov, 2018: 337). Although this term was legally defined in a 1999 federal law in 
Russia, its vague meaning has served as a catch-all label to justify policies intended to 
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“protect” whoever classifies as a compatriot by Russian governmental definition (ethnic 
Russians, Russian-speakers, “passportized” compatriots) (Pieper, 2018: 16). 
In geopolitical discourses diaspora typically comes as a model of influence without a 
sphere, which facilitates indirect political advantage beyond the state borders by 
simultaneously presenting suitable prospects for soft power influence (Suslov, 2018: 
333). As Putin also once explained, the concept of the Russian world “from time 
immemorial went far beyond the geographical boundaries of Russia and even far beyond 
the boundaries of the Russian ethnos” (O`Loughlin et al., 2017: 6). 
Another uniting bond within the Russian world discourse are Russian Orthodoxy and the 
traditional values it supports (as alternative to liberal democracy) (Kudors, 2015). East 
Slavic countries, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, as well as Moldova and Kazakhstan belong to 
the geographical space the Patriarchate of Moscow and all Rus` has an authority over 
(Laruelle, 2015: 15). The Orthodox Church, both cultural heritage and a strong 
government-affiliated institution, has been active in maintaining supranational values in 
Russian consciousness and the unity of Russian civilizational space (Polegkyi, 2011: 18).  
The shared legacy serves as another pillar of the Russian world concept. Not only overall 
Soviet nostalgia, but also certain episodes from the near past, most notably the Great 
Patriotic War, are among the common bonds (Polegkyi, 2011: 18) that hold together 
millions of former Soviet citizens. In this regard, Russian and Soviet identities may be 
considered as parts of the same continuum, with the Soviet past having been 
mythologized and inserted into the present Russian world (Kuzio, 2015: 159). 
Nikonov (2017) assumes that a polyethnic, multi-confessional and polysemantic Russian 
world is Russia plus the Russian abroad. Similarly, Pieper (2018: 8) summarizes the 
Russian World as a “supranational structure that consists of Russia, the Russian diaspora 
abroad and Russian speaking communities, which consider Russia as their cultural and 
spiritual center”. Suslov (2017: 10) brings three types of people that could be ascribed to 
the Russian world (beyond Russia proper): 150 million of the former Soviet citizens, 15 
million ethnic Russians, some 5 million emigrated citizens of the Russian Federation. 
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Depending on the selected ideological constructs, this thesis combines the following 
aspects for constructing Russianness: Russian language, Russian ethnicity, Orthodox 
Church, Soviet legacy (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Construction of Russianness 
 
Parameters of 
Russianness 
 
Ethnic Russians in 
the Near 
Abroad 
 
      Non-Russian 
former Soviet   
citizens 
 
Global Russians 
Russian 
language 
Yes Yes or No Yes 
Russian 
ethnicity 
Yes No Irrelevant 
Orthodox 
Church 
Yes Yes or No Yes 
Soviet 
legacy 
Yes Yes Irrelevant 
 
 
Conceived in the 1990s as a culturally-bounded, deterritorialized network community, 
the concept of the Russian world was further developed, first as a nation-state and its loyal 
diaspora, later as an expanding state-civilization (Suslov, 2018: 346). Institutionalizing 
and instrumentalizing of the Russian world took place mainly in the first decade of the 
20th century, when the diaspora policy was designated along the following lines: first, its 
strategic planning became further centralized within and influenced by the Kremlin; 
second, the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine pushed the Russian leadership to a more 
aggressive and anti-Western position (Suslov, 2018: 338); third, with the creation of 
several organizations, most notably, the Russkiy Mir Foundation3 in 2007 and the 
Rossotrudnichestvo4 federal agency in 2008, the compatriot policy was frameworked 
within government-affiliated organizations (Suslov, 2017: 22-23; Suslov, 2018: 339). 
Russia’s claims to “protect” Russians abroad were translated into a foreign policy 
objective with the outbreak of war in Georgia in 2008, when the concept was weaponized, 
                                                          
3 About Russkiy Mir Foundation. Accessed on May 9, 2019, https://russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php  
4 About Rossotrudnichestvo. Accessed on May 9, 2019, http://rs.gov.ru/en/about  
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but this time as hard power. The protection of compatriots in Georgia`s breakaway 
provinces South Ossetia and Abkhazia featured prominently in Russia’s rhetoric to justify 
a “rescue mission” for allegedly humanitarian reasons (Pieper, 2018: 16).  
Suslov (2017: 14, 25) notes that the concept started drifting towards being a geopolitical 
tool from merely serving as a cultural-diasporal frame in 2012. After Putin’s return to the 
Russian presidency in that year, the notion ‘Russian world’ switched to a more 
pronounced civilizational meaning. According to Nikonov (2017), internally, within 
Russia, ‘Russian’ usually means ethnocultural identity, while externally, it becomes 
supra-ethnic, superethnic, and in a certain sense civilizational. In this sense, as a global 
signifier, this new meaning was supposed to explain Russia as a “distinctive world power 
with its own civilizational space” (O`Loughlin et al., 2017: 7). The Russian world, thus, 
became one of the ideological foundations of multi-polarity in Russia`s foreign policy 
terminology (Laruelle 2015: 21) and a response, as a conservative conception, to the 
challenges of Westernism and globalization (Kudors, 2015).  
Laruelle (2015: 9-11) lists several channels of the Russian influence to the Russian world: 
economic tools (investments, pressure), multilateral organizations, NGO diplomacy, 
culture, education media and language promotion, guest workers in Russia, repatriation, 
citizenship policy and passportization. 
While the Russian world was initally accepted by the neighboring post-Soviet countries 
with fear and caution, the post-Crimean situation further antagonized this term for them: 
unlike the previous understanding of Russian world as a network community of 
deterritorialized Russian-speakers, its geopolitical narrative became irredentist (Suslov, 
2018: 344) and took rather a practical meaning as recollecting of the Russian lands 
(Piontkovsky, 2014). Thus, Wawrzonek sees the Russkiy mir as a doctrinal foundation 
(2014: 760) and pretext (2014: 776) for Russia`s political, economic or security pressures 
toward the neighboring countries. 
As seen, the concept ‘Russian world’ is a “geopolitical imagination, a fuzzy mental atlas” 
and “a floating signifier” (Laruelle, 2015: 1), which may encompass various regions 
connected with Russia in different and blurry ways. This blurriness, however, allows 
numerous interpretations depending on the context. Firstly, it can serve as a reasoning for 
Russia`s assertive policy especially in the Near Abroad (Pieper, 2018: 9-10). Secondly, 
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this framework reconnects the present-day Russia with its “pre-Soviet and Soviet past 
through reconciliation with Russian diasporas abroad” (Laruelle, 2015: 1). Further, it is 
an ambitious project the Kremlin wants to use as a “global ideological influence” it lost 
with the end of Communism (O`Loughlin et al., 2017: 7).  
 
2.2.2. Pan-Turkism  
Pan-Turkism is an ideological movement which emerged during the 1880s among Turkic 
intellectuals of the Russian and Ottoman empires, with its aim being the solidarity or 
union of all Turkic ethnic groups “bound to each other by a common or kindred language, 
race or tradition” (Landau, 1995: 180) while they are scattered across different states, 
both Turkic and non-Turkic. The rise of this phenomenon was inspired by and as a 
response to the development of other pan-ethnic movements, especially Pan-Slavism in 
Russia (Landau, 1991: 82; Hyman, 1997: 341-342; Tüfekçi, 2017: 13).  
Since the late 19th century, Pan-Turkism has evolved through several stages. The first 
phase is marked with the theoretical foundations of this ideology. Initiated by İsmail 
Gaspıralı from the Crimean Tatars, who proposed one all-Turkic language (Landau, 1991: 
82-83; Bekirova, 2018), Yusuf Akçura (1904) from Kazan Tatars who authored Three 
Types of Policy, the earliest manifesto of the Pan-Turkic nationalism, as well as Əhməd 
bəy Ağaoğlu and Əli bəy Hüseynzadə from Azerbaijan (Landau, 1991: 83-84), the 
concept became more widespread among Ottoman intellectuals during the twilight of the 
empire (Landau, 1995; Hyman, 1997).  
Pan-Turkism`s principles were famously conceptualized by Ziya Gökalp. In his 1923 The 
Principles of Turkism, Gökalp (1968) stated that Turkism means to exalt the Turkish / 
Turkic nation and defined Pan-Turkism “as a cultural, academic, philosophical and 
political school of thought and concept advocating the unity of Turkic peoples”. His view 
of Pan-Turkic development distinguished three magnitudes of Turkism:  
1) Turkeyism: strengthening national culture and solidarity of the Turks in the Republic 
of Turkey; 2) Oghuzism or Turkmenism: reaching as an immediate goal an Oghuz unity, 
which would consist of Oghuz Turks (also known as Turkmens) of Azerbaijan, Iran and 
Khwarazm, who share almost the same language and one common culture with the Turks 
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of Turkey; thus, these four groups can form Oghuzistan5; 3) Turanism: striving as a long-
range ideal for the unity of more distant Turkic-speaking peoples, such as Yakuts, 
Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Kipchaks and Tatars, which together with the Oghuz group constitute 
Greater Turkistan. 
Blended with romantic and emotional ideals, the doctrine of the Pan-Turkic irredentism 
constructs “common history, common language, common identity and common culture”6 
as the main pillars for cultural and, if possible, for political union.  
As in similar cases with other Pan-ideologies, Pan-Turkism aimed to revive an ancient 
culture, as part of its search for common roots. The rediscovery and reassertion of their 
own culture was suitable for creating a nation of all the fellow-nationals and 
differentiating them from others. Together with the ancient culture, which is a joint 
patrimony, other symbols, such as common origin myths and totems were also 
constructed during the theoretical foundation of Pan-Turkism: Grey Wolf (Bozkurt)7 as a 
mythical ancestor (Atsız, 1972; Babayev, 2016; Tüfekçi, 2017: 14), Ergenekon as a 
legend of origin (Ünver, 2009: 1-2), Altaic and Tian Shen mountains as a sacralized point 
where the Turks originated in and spread to the world from (Bayat, 2016; Karluk, 2019). 
Historical victories have also been mythicized to glorify the Turkic past and superiority 
(e.g. the Great Wall of China was erected to resist the ancient Turkic tribes, who 
nevertheless overcame it (Sarı, 2016; Osman, 2017) or Atilla as a great Turkic leader, 
who conquered Europe and forced the Pope to kneel8 9).  
Geography holds an important position within the Turkic ideology: the enthusiasm for 
building links of hundreds of millions of blood brethren scattered across the vast territory 
was popular already in the early 20th century and best reflected in the poem Turan by 
                                                          
5 The object of our study, the Gagauz, as an Oghuz group could fit Gökalp`s second magnitude. 
6 About Turkic Council. Accessed on May 3, 2019. https://www.turkkon.org/en/turk-konseyi-hakkinda  
7 The flag of the unrecognized Gagauz Republic, the predecessor of the the current Gagauz autonomy, 
was also decorated with wolf`s head. 
8 Roma Papasına diz çökdürən “Tanrının qırmancı” – Hun imperatoru Atilla (in Azerbaijani). Accessed on 
May 4, 2019. http://strateq.az/arashdirma/66804/roma-papasina-diz-cokdur%C9%99n-tanri-
qirmanci.html  
9 Attila: Avrupa'da “Tanrı'nın Kırbacı” olarak anılan Attila, tarihte papaya diz çöktüren tek hükümdardır 
(in Turkish). Accessed on May 4, 2019. https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/kimdir/Attila  
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Gökalp (1911): “The fatherland for Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkestan. The fatherland 
is a vast and eternal land: Turan!” 
Central to Pan-Turkic discourse, the popular motto “From the Adriatic / the Balkans to 
the Chinese wall” (Efegil, 2008: 167; Kara, 2012: 157; Bayaliyev, 2014) points to the 
ideology`s geographical ambitions. Interestingly enough, one of the last famous 
references to this slogan was made by Turkish President Erdoğan, who re-affirmed “We 
are a big family of 300 million people from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China!”10 in 
fall 2018 in Gagauzia, one of the westernmost corners of the Turkosphere.  
Meanwhile, religion`s place within Pan-Turkism is somewhat ambivalent. It can partly 
be intertwined with and/or internalize Islamic elements, given the Muslim background of 
most of the Turkic peoples, which is mirrored the formula “Turkicization, Islamicization 
and modernization” that entered into circulation in the early 20th century echoes (Gökalp, 
2014). However, opposite views may also favor revival of Tengriism and Shamanism, 
ancient Turkic faiths (Ayupov, 2012).  
The mid-20th century also saw the organizational efforts within Pan-Turkism, which re-
entered Turkey`s political mainstream in the 1950s-1960s. The most famous of such 
organizations were the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and its 
radical wing, Idealist Clubs/Hearths (Ülkü Ocakları) also known as Grey Wolves 
(Bozkurtlar) (Landau, 1988; Landau, 1991: 90). Having never become a dominant force 
in domestic political spectrum, NMP and Grey Wolves, however, were quite vocal and 
occasionally shaped Turkish and international politics (usually having anti-Russian 
and/or anti-Communist flavour).  
The transformation of Pan-Turkism from an internal political movement into a 
geopolitical concept coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union and emergence of 
independent Turkic states. The vacuum created by the dissolution of the USSR opened 
gates wide for Turkey`s penetration into Caucasus and Central Asia rich in natural 
resources. It was that time, when the Grey Wolves proposed “a pan-Turkish extension of 
the Turkish nation-state” (Tunander, 1995) by embracing newly independent Turkic 
                                                          
10 "Biz Adriyatik'ten Çin Seddi'ne ulaşan 300 milyonluk büyük bir aileyiz" (in Turkish). October 18, 2018. 
Accessed on May 3, 2019. https://www.sabah.com.tr/webtv/turkiye/biz-adriyatikten-cin-seddine-
ulasan-300-milyonluk-buyuk-bir-aileyiz  
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states. The renewed Pan-Turkism would also target Turkic minorities (some with 
autonomies) within Russia, Iran, China, Moldova. Since the early 1990s, these Turkic 
states and communities have been represented as Turkey’s siblings, toward whom it has 
a historical responsibility (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2011: 188; Kara, 2012: 157-170).  
Geopolitically, Turkey realized how important the afore-mentioned regions would grow 
both as a source of natural reserves and a transit corridor between Europe and China 
(Balcer, 2012). Having taken advantage of this historical opportunity, Turkey under late 
President Turgut Özal moved swiftly to strengthen its ties with the new Turkic republics, 
primarily through investment and social initiatives (Bayaliyev, 2014). Encouraged by 
Özal, Turkish businesses became heavily engaged, having made investments and 
supported the establishment of private sector in these former socialistic countries 
(Landau, 1995: 208-209; Kara, 2012). Turkey`s soft power was driven also by Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA)11 established in 1992 for “providing 
economic, technical, social assistance” (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2011: 186) to the Central Asian 
republics and Azerbaijan. In other words, Turkey enormously contributed to post-Soviet 
transition its kin states in the 1990s.  
However, the speculations (mainly in Turkey and Azerbaijan) on a Turkic union to grow 
as another global power (to be on par with the USA, the EU, Russia and China) in the 
1990s made many regional states (especially those with Turkic ethnic groups), Russia, 
China, and Iran, perceive Pan-Turkism as a new form of Turkey`s imperial ambitions 
(Kara, 2012; Valvo, 2012).  
The ongoing phase can be marked with institutionalization of the Turkic world with 
Turkey being the main promoter of such cooperation. It started with activities in the 
cultural sphere in the 1990s, when the first Pan-Turkic entity, the International 
Organization of Turkic Culture (Türksoy)12 was established (Balcer, 2012: 154). 
Moreover, the summits of the heads of independent Turkic states have been held regularly 
since 1992 (Kaplan et al., 2015: 126). 
This institutionalization took a more serious turn in the 2000s, when the sovereign Turkic 
states aimed to form an economic and political integration similar to the European Union. 
                                                          
11 History of TIKA. Accessed on May 3, 2019. https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/history_of_tika-8526  
12 About Turksoy. Accessed on May 3, 2019. https://www.turksoy.org/tr/turksoy/about  
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The major intergovernmental organization, Turkic Council, was established in 2009. Its 
primary organs are the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the 
Council of Elders, the Senior Officials Committee and the Secretariat. Their activities are 
assisted by affiliated structures such as the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking 
Countries (TurkPA), Türksoy, the International Turkic Academy, the Turkic Culture and 
Heritage Foundation, the Turkic Business Council and the Turkic University Union13. 
The Pan-Turkic concept has over a century evolved from irredentism to solidarity to 
current supranational institutionalism. It is still a vivid ideology that can be geopolitically 
instrumentalized. No matter how much other independent and dependent Turkic entities 
weigh, Turkey, as the most powerful and best-established out of them, is still a central 
actor within the Turkic domain. Therefore, this paper focuses more on Turkey`s foreign 
policy and soft power within Pan-Turkic paradigm.  
 
2.2.3. EU normative power 
A post-Westphalian political entity and specific international actor, the European Union 
has for decades amassed a rich experience of integration and collaboration and been 
exporting certain values and norms. Conceptualized initially as a civil(ian) and later as a 
normative power, the EU is founded on a constellation of values and principles that lie at 
the heart of its external policies. For countries that strive to be Europeanized, adopting 
these values is a key condition: it was best displayed during the integration of former 
Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which successfully accomplished 
their transition by internalizing European norms and resetting their institutional system 
(Valiyeva, 2016: 20; Zielonka, 2013: 42-43). 
Ideas related to civilian power which could best fit Europe`s global actorness were 
initially offered by François Duchêne, advisor to Jean Monnet (Manners, 2000: 3; 
Sjursen, 2005: 1; Bachmann & Sidaway, 2008: 95). With this approach Duchêne claimed 
that in the geopolitical conditions of the 1970s, a period marked by increasing economic 
interdependencies, integrational and globalisation processes, the power of the common 
European structures in international system should be based not on military force, but on 
                                                          
13 About Turkic Council. Accessed on May 3, 2019. https://www.turkkon.org/en/turk-konseyi-hakkinda  
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their common market, economic and political tools, through which Europe could 
designate areas of influence in the world (Gerrits, 2009: 1, 3; Skolimowska, 2015: 115). 
Against the backdrop of the American-Soviet rivalry that shaped Europe`s geopolitical 
identity, Duchêne argued that the continent should seek a flexible alternative conception 
(Bachmann & Sidaway, 2008: 96-97). In the center of civilian power identity is the claim 
that Europe could exert a positive and stabilizing influence on the international system, 
given the continent`s own experience of transformation from a historical domain of 
geopolitical conflicts to a system of integration (Bachmann & Sidaway, 2008: 97; 
Skolimowska, 2015: 114-116). 
In the early 2000s, the EU`s global civilian power was announced as “a wider aspiration 
about Europe’s collective world role” by Javier Solana (Bachmann & Sidaway, 2008: 95) 
and for “sustainable global development” by Romano Prodi (Manners, 2000: 26).  
Developed by Manners (2000; 2002; 2006), the concept ‘normative power’ should be 
understood as the ability of one international actor to exert its ideological influence on 
other members in international relations (described as ‘power over opinion’ and 
‘ideological power’) (Skolimowska, 2015: 116-117) and to shape or normalize the 
international environment through rules and values (Valiyeva, 2016: 15). In this vision, 
‘Normative Power Europe’ is assigned to act through functional spheres of influence, 
such as values, commerce and diplomacy rather than primarily territorial ones (Sjursen, 
2005: 4-5; Bachmann & Sidaway, 2008: 97). In other words, promoting European 
standards, norms, principles and procedures (Gerrits, 2009: 2; Skolimowska, 2015: 112) 
(rather than using coercive means) constitutes one of the most important dimensions of 
the EU’s geopolitical ideology that secures its international and regional actorness 
(Christou, 2010: 415-416; Nitoiu & Sus, 2019: 2).  
According to Manners (2002: 240-241), the normative power the EU possesses stems 
from several sources: historical context (the legacy of two world wars), hybrid polity (a 
post-Westphalian character with supranational and international institutions) and 
political-legal constitutionalism (an elite-driven, treaty-based legal order). 
In the center of EU`s geopolitical soft power lies its attractiveness, while the so-called 
EU-niversal norms, peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as multilateralism, good governance, and the 
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restriction of the use of force as a means for international politics have been designated 
as the core for the European normative ideology (Aggestam, 2009: 28; Manners, 2002: 
242-243; Manners, 2009: 3; Nitoiu & Sus, 2019: 4; Skolimowska, 2015: 117). Moreover, 
concepts such as collective security and positive interdependence instead of unilateral 
action and competing interests (Sjursen, 2005: 4; Popescu, 2008: 425) are also prioritized 
within this framework. Diffused beyond the EU`s boundaries, these values construct its 
attraction: “most neighbouring countries wish to join it rather than balance or resist it, and 
other regional groupings around the world seek to emulate it” (Valiyeva, 2016: 13).  
Three supplementary roles for the EU, a normative power, in international system are 
specified by Bachmann & Sidaway (2008: 99): 1) The EU as a model “for regional 
integration and the development of peace and prosperity”, after and despite centuries of 
bloody conflicts on European soil. 2) The EU as a promoter or a force for international 
diffusion of universal values and democratic standards. 3) The EU as a counterweight to 
alternative sources of influence.  
At the same time, Zielonka (2013), Del Sarto (2016) and Pänke (2019) focus on the EU’s 
imperial paradigm, calling the entity a “normative empire” or “liberal empire”, its 
external engagement “normative imperialism”. Despite its unique and sui generis nature, 
the EU is described by Pänke (2019: 103) as “part of a political continuum”, which is 
“inextricable from its historical roots and predecessors”: the EU model seems to be 
derived from legacies of imperial rule, since empires also aim at hegemony in vast “and 
politically, economically, and culturally diverse geographical spaces”. As Zielonka 
(2013: 35-36) explains, the EU is a modern type of empire, which may not resemble the 
nineteenth‐century classic imperial powers, having “neither a clearly defined centre of 
authority nor a sizable military”. Nonetheless, possessing all the key features of empires, 
the EU acts the way its imperial predecessors had always done. According to both Pänke 
(2019) and Zielonka (2013: 35-36), even the claims about Europe as a promoter of its 
internal values’ or as a ‘civilizing power’ can echo with earlier imperialistic conceptions 
of Europe’s mission civilisatrice.  
Though the EU has based its foreign policy on peace and cooperation and is set to avoid 
“traditional trappings of geopolitics and realpolitik” (Nitoiu & Sus, 2019: 2), it has always 
been under the pressure of geography and had to take into account spatial dimension: the 
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EU holds a distinct geographical space, while striving to disseminate its values and norms 
to adjacent areas. The Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods are bright examples of 
geography the EU external policies have had direct interactions with.  
The EU’s aspiration to multiply its template or produce an international milieu resembling 
its own model epitomises one of its central foreign policy and ideological objectives 
(Valiyeva, 2016: 15). The EU`s neighbourhood policies or milieu goals are designed to 
shape conditions beyond the entity`s boundaries and transform the adjacent environment 
rather than to defend or increase its possessions (Beauguitte et al., 2015: 10). Ambitions 
to shape the adjacent territories and international neighbourhood in accordance with one’s 
own vision and normative order stem from and are motivated by own security and even 
survival concerns (Valiyeva, 2016: 16). 
Since the early 1990s, the EU’s milieu projects have been concentrating chiefly on the 
former Communist and Soviet countries in Central and Eastern Europe,. Within the 
normative duty narrative, an actualization of the EU`s milieu goals indicates 
Europeanization of neighboring regions or development of an international environment 
akin to European: after all, a “ring of friends” or regions consisting of democratic, stable 
and prosperous nations with effective governance and universal values, would best fit the 
interests of European security.  
Nonetheless, the EU`s region-building efforts in the neighbourhood are usually one-sided 
and reflect the EU’s own geopolitical imagination. The 2003 European Neighbourhood 
Policy and the 2009 Eastern Partnership frameworks “aimed at the extension of EU values 
and norms to neighbours through conditionality and extended governance” (Raik, 2019: 
55) and were constructed to ensure security, stability, prosperity, shared values and the 
rule of law in the EU’s direct neighbourhood by offering “everything but institutions” 
(Chilosi, 2006). Though these projects mainly provide fertile ground for future 
perspectives rather than direct integration, they may still be interpreted as the 
acknowledgement of six post-Soviet countries as a natural part of European normative 
order (Christou 2010: 413-416; Valiyeva, 2016: 18).  
The EU`s eastward geopolitical ambitions are characterized by several factors, including 
weakly governance, political and economic instability, the so-called frozen (but active) 
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conflicts (whose potential spillover threatens the EU’s own security), as well as the claims 
to the region by another important regional security actor, Russia (Christou, 2010: 413).  
By quoting Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Bachmann & Sidaway (2008: 104) explain 
that the European project cannot and must not identify where Europe and its influence 
ends, instead seeing Europe as a continuous process of improvement and evolution. 
 
2.3. Toal`s “contested geopolitical field” model 
The studied theme, Gagauz regional identity vis-à-vis geopolitical ideologies, involves 
several actors. Thus, Gagauzia, which for centuries has been situated at the crossroads of 
empires, once again finds itself in and as a field for geopolitical competition. This struggle 
occurs at several – sub-national, national and international – levels. A complicated 
situation observed in Gagauzia can match and be studied through the “contested 
geopolitical field” model by Toal (2017: 33).  
 
Figure 2. Post-Soviet space as a contested geopolitical field  
(original model by Toal, 2017: 38) 
32 
 
Toal`s model (2017: 36) is based on the geopolitical situation in a post-imperial area. 
Projected after the post-Soviet space, the original model comprises the following actors:  
1) A metropolitan state, which tries to find a stable post-imperial identity for itself and to 
maintain its influence over the former imperial territories. A post-Soviet Russia is implied 
as the metropolitan state within this model.  
2) An inner abroad within the metropolitan power is a non-core nation that strives for 
larger autonomy or even independence. Russia`s ethnic federal subjects, such as 
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya suit this role.  
3) Nationalizing states, former parts of the imperial entity, either border or are close to 
the metropolitan state. Their main aim is to get rid of the imperial legacy, as well as post-
imperial (inter)dependence with the metropolitan power. Joining alternative integrational 
and security projects to counter the metropolitan power`s hegemony is among the options 
for nationalizing states, which constitute some post-Soviet states, including Moldova. 
4) Secessionist regions are minority areas and/or entities inside nationalizing states. These 
could be latent or active secessionst movements given the developments in early post-
imperial years, as well as the current relations between nationalizing states and their 
minorities. Such regions may share direct border with the metropolitan power and (even 
in the absence of such physical contact) maintain historically positive attitude historical 
connection with the metropolitcan power. In some cases, secessionist movements may 
even have kindred regions in the metropolitan power. Gagauzia that has historical 
connections to Russia and shares ethno-linguistic kinship with some of Russia`s subjects 
(Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, etc.) perfectly fits this model. Other bright examples could be 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which also border Russia and have relative ethnic areas: 
Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia respectively.  
5) An external normative power in its turn tries to expand its sphere of influence over 
former imperial territories. The European Union assumes this role in Toal`s model.  
Putting together all the pieces of puzzles, we receive the following picture:  Russia, as the 
major exporter of the Russian world concept is the metropolitan state that strives to 
maintain post-imperial sphere of influence; Russia`s own inner abroad, many ethnic 
federal subjects, contains potential for bigger autonomy or even independence; Moldova, 
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a nationalizing state, belongs to this sphere of influence but seeks to break the dependence 
from the metropolitan state and possibly to join alternative regional projects; Gagauzia is 
a national minority regional organization that has closer ties with the metropolitan state 
than with the nationalizing state it is part of. The European Union fits the external 
normative power, the fifth player type in Toal`s model, which is eager to expand its 
influence into the post-Soviet space.  
This model serves as a good template with the author`s own addition: a factor of a kin-
state. Thus, enter a sixth actor in this field: 
6) An external kin power also seeks to broaden its influence into post-imperial space, both 
toward Secessionist Region (4) in Nationalizing State (3) and even Inner Abroad (2) 
within Metropolitan State (1). As a kin power, Turkey is an alternative source of 
geopolitical ideology that clashes with others over Gagauzia. Additionally, the 
geopolitical concept Turkey offers may also target Russia`s Turkic subjects.  
As a result, with the author`s modification the thesis receives the following contested 
geopolitical field model as depicted in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Post-Soviet space as a Contested Geopolitical Field  
(model modified by author) 
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This model could be further perplexed by adding a seventh actor, a kin state which wants 
to (re)unify with Nationalizing State, with the former being Romania. Not so relevant for 
the topic of this thesis to be presented as a separate actor in our puzzle, Romania is, 
nevertheless, examined within the EU normative power domain.  
While national minorities within nationalizing successor states strive to develop distinct 
regional identities, these minorities are still subject to the geopolitical projections of 
various actors. As Toal (2017: 35) explains, a set of different factors impacts regional 
identities of such non-core groups: their quantity, the level of their developoment and 
prosperity, the degree of local autonomy, potential for further development of this 
autonomy, the extent of popular mobilization, strength of local organizations, etc. The 
aspects of external influences, geopolitical ideologies, in the Gagauz context are 
discussed in the following parts of the thesis.  
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3. Research design and methodology 
3.1. Research strategy  
This thesis is founded on qualitative research, which can be suitable for an in-depth study 
of a limited number of complex cases, by employing constructive and interpetive 
approaches. The former asserts that knowledge is a product of social processes, while the 
latter seeks to understand various phenomena (events and actions) through the meanings 
ascribed to them by people (Magnusson & Marecek, 2015: 2).  
Within this study regional identity is conceptualized as collective consciousness of the 
region`s denizens rather than the image of the region; the former is more complicated and 
emotional and can be expressed through narratives.  
Narrative, as a combination of storylines of individuals and collectives, aims to make 
sense of human experience and construct it into meaningful episodes (Prokkola & 
Ridanpää, 2011: 777; Subotić, 2013: 306; Tamboukou, 2015: 39). It can provide 
sufficient information on how people perceive what surrounds them, how they construct 
and reconstruct their concept of Self and Other in terms of time and place that constanly 
manipulate identity (Patterson & Monroe 1998: 316; Prokkola & Ridanpää, 2011: 778). 
Not only does narrative – written, oral, visual – transmit knowledge and reality, but also 
create it: narrative orders our world, by enabling and limiting representation. 
As narrative influences our perceptions of political reality, which in turn influences our 
responses to political events; in other words, narrative plays a significant role in 
constructing political behavior. In this sense, we create and utilize narratives to interpret 
and understand political realities that surround us (Patterson & Monroe 1998: 315). 
Tamboukou (2015: 40) essentializes three key featurs of narrative: temporality (sequence 
of events), meaningfulness and sociality. The author would add spatiality into this 
framework as narrative is usually associated with certain geographic location. Spatial 
identity may be linked with narrative, which means that individuals express a sense of 
who they are and where they belong to. Constructing and shaping spatial consciousness 
and social practices from above and charged with political, economic, cultural interests, 
such discourses can then be spread with different media channels. On the other hand, 
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identity narratives can be generated from below, which is usually the case with the 
oppressed, the subjugated such as minorities or the displaced (Paasi, 2009: 142).  
As regions themselves are social constructs, region-building can be perceived as a process 
or set of different institutional and cultural practices which become a part of everyday 
life, consciousness and identity of region inhabitants. Narratives of regional identity are, 
therefore, reckoned “an important part of region-building, defining the identity of a region 
and mediating a (more or less) shared consciousness of it as an entity in its own right” 
(Prokkola & Ridanpää, 2011: 776). 
Gagauz regional identity may be treated in a bottom-up (vis-à-vis Moldova) or top-down 
(if we accept Gagauzia as a separate unit in which ruling elites and decision-makers try 
to forge the regional identity that would suit their interests) approach, the latter being 
examined in this thesis. 
Therefore, narrative analysis seems very helpful in providing understanding “on the 
cognitive process and on the role of culture in shaping any human universals” (Patterson 
& Monroe 1998: 315). Analysis of narrative tries to uncover ways in which a story is 
constructed, for whom and for what purpose. This technique helps to analyze how major 
actors that shape discourse in Gagauzia narrate and interpret Gagauz regional identity, 
especially in the context of outer geopolitical ideologies strong enough to influence the 
region. This way the study examines how these actors construct the Gagauz Self versus 
foreign Other(s), how foreign norms and values are internalized or rejected and whether 
this Self is ascribed into any spatial or ideological framework beyond Gagauzia. 
 
3.2. Research design  
This research is a single case study, which allows the author to provide rigorous analysis 
by considering specific conditions and relevant contexts of a singular phenomenon.  
Gagauzia is definitely not the only sub-state unit whose regional belonging is shaped by 
the contest of geopolitical ideologies. However, the author found it unproductive to 
compare it with other cases: Russia`s Turkic autonomies, most notably Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan, could have been subject to the growing Pan-Turkist influence in the 
1990s; nonetheless, then this influence might have challenged Russia`s territorial 
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integrity, not geopolitical ideology, as the Russian world was not fully conceptualized 
and organized as it is now. The Russian-populated areas in Latvia and Estonia could have 
provided another interesting contested geopolitical field; however, these countries` EU 
membership and absence of any territorial framework of the Russian population make 
this case incompatible with Toal`s model.  
Therefore, demographically small and geographically peripheral, Gagauzia delivers a 
fascinating case for exploring the relationship between regional identity and geopolitical 
ideology. In other words, here the author`s main aim is to examine a distinctive case, not 
to draw general conclusions. 
 
3.3. Data collection process  
In our case, it is important to study how the Gagauz attach meaning and significance to 
the key concepts, geopolitical ideology and regional identity, and how they interpret their 
belonging to a particular geopolitical template. These concepts are connected with 
narratives which construct and reconstruct identity; thus, analysis of these narratives 
provides valuable understanding how the Gagauz make and use stories to construct their 
identity (Self-Other) and define their regional belonging: how they represent themselves 
against the world (or other worlds / regions / geopolitical ideologies) in the contemporary 
context, given political, social, economic, historical and cultural factors.  
Narratives are social constructs created by social actors for specific (e.g., political) goals 
(Subotić, 2013: 326), while Tomaney (2007: 357) further points that collective identities 
are invented upon discourses which heavily engage “intellectuals, cultural producers, and 
political leaders”. Therefore, by accepting the top-down nature of regional identity, the 
author turns to the Gagauz elite, political, cultural and intellectual, as the major agency 
that plays a key role and possesses channels for influence in creating images and 
narratives of the region, in forming public opinion and constructing the identity.  
The top-down approach necessitated the interaction with an elite group. Given the vague, 
broad and flexible meaning of the word ‘elite’, the author assumed the role of interpreting 
this concept, accepting it as a combination of leadership and intelligentsia, and including 
the following professionals into this elite group: politician, lecturer, doctor, civil activist, 
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journalist, film producer, poet. Therefore, the sampling process is purposive, but was 
facilitated through snowballing.  
In order to collect data from the representatives of the Gagauz elites and understand a 
mirror reflection of their reality, qualitative interviewing was chosen as a major method 
that can help to collect and examine narrative accounts of social worlds (Miller & 
Glassner, 2016: 52-53, 62).  
For this purpose, on February 1-18, 2019 the author participated in a fieldwork in 
Gagauzia to get acquainted with the natural setting through direct experience and to 
conduct face-to-face interaction with the interviewees. Thus, the empirical findings are 
derived from interview transcriptions. Moreover, the overall experience in Gagauzia 
helped the author to get an access to the primary sources, observe the socio-cultural 
environment where the narratives are formed, and understand the contextuality which 
have left the imprints in regional identity.  
In-depth interviewing with 10 selected participants tête-à-tête proved to be especially a 
valuable method for delivering culturally embedded explanations that represent 
microcosms of interviewees (Miller & Glassner, 2016: 56). Face-to-face communication 
also provided more freedom and flexibility to both sides and enabled the interviewer to 
ask additional questions when necessary. Open-ended questions had been designed for 
the process for receiving what Magnusson & Marecek (2015: 48) name “rich talk”, a 
comprehensive opinion interviewees are motivated to express.  
The interviews had initially been set as structured in order to carry on discussions along 
the same theme with each interlocutor. Thus, no deviations happened from the basic 
questioning order and wording, as the interviewer followed exactly what had earlier been 
written. Yet, in case of necessity (clarifications), additional and spin-off questions were 
asked like in semi-structured interviews. Follow-up questions were also available usually 
at the end of the interviews to understand the interviewees` views more comprehensively. 
In other words, the interviews were designed and, in some cases, conducted as 
standardized. In others, they ended up as semi-standardized. The main goal for using 
standardized (structurized) interviews was to maximize the flow of valid, reliable and 
straight information while diminishing distortions from the main line of the conversation 
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(Holstein & Gubrium, 2016: 69). However, switching to semi-standardized also allowed 
more flexibility. In some occassions the interviews might have gone a bit off-topic and 
beyond the scope of the subject; those parts which provided no value and meaning for the 
content were skipped or ignored during the analysis.  
Although pre-interview conversation, as well as some remarks during the interview was 
made in Azerbaijani, Turkish and Gagauz (three almost mutually intelligible languages), 
the formal parts of the interviews were made in Russian for easy translation into English.  
In the beginning each interlocutor permitted audio-recording and use of their names. 
Despite the initial fears that a recording device might make some interviewees nervous 
and/or lead to insincere responses with a more diplomatic language being preferred, all 
respondents handled it readily, with all the interviews having proceeded as frank 
conversations. The device provided verbatim records to be kept as documents and helped 
the author not to miss any key bits of information. Each audio-record was then transcribed 
and translated from Russian and partially Gagauz to English.  
Almost each ending of the interview was also used for snowballing. This very technique 
seemed more appropriate: since regional identity is accepted as a top-down process, 
which is shaped and directed by political, intellectual and cultural elite, each information-
rich interviewee was asked for additional relevant contact(s). Chain referral worked very 
well in the small Gagauz community, where everyone knows everyone.  
All the interviews took place in Comrat, the capital of Gagauzia, which could seem a 
limitation for the process. On the other hand, it should be noted that all snowballed 
politicians and intellectuals needed for the interview are concentrated in Comrat, which 
is the political, cultural and intellectual center.   
As there exists no fixed or optimal number of participants for interpretive researches 
(Magnusson & Marecek, 2015: 37), the author decided to work with that number of 
interviews he could handle to process further.  
Their interviews can provide important insight into various elements of political and 
social life of Gagauzia, the general trends that currently prevail in Gagauz society and 
even some general forecasts on possible future orientation of the autonomy. Combination 
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of data collected through interview may shed light on and deliver important understanding 
of being Gagauz in such a complicated region.  
Other textual materials, scholarly articles on Gagauzia, official documents on and of 
Gagauzia, daily news from Gagauzia (by using websites such as gagauzinfo.md, 
gagauz.md, sabaa.md), as well as statistical figures from official sources and media also 
enabled the author to understand Gagauzia better and provided supplementary data for 
the general analysis. 
 
3.4. Data analysis method 
The analysis was carried out within a constructivist framework and with understanding 
that each member of society constantly constructs their world and attaches meaning to 
different constructs based on assumptions that individuals seek understanding of the 
world in which they live and work and hence develop subjective meanings of their 
experiences (Creswell, 2013). 
Narrative approach is employed in this thesis, as it is crucial in constructing a meaning of 
purpose and place for both individuals and collectives. The shared stories of a culture 
provide grounds for common understandings and interpretation (Patterson & Monroe 
1998: 321; Prokkola & Ridanpää, 2011: 778). 
The narrative analysis started with the verbatim transcription of the interviews, as well as 
their translation from Russian to English. The data were familiarized through multiple 
reading.  
As each answer in the interviews suits a particular topic (Gagauz identity, Turkey, EU, 
Russia, Moldova), categorizing them was not difficult. To visualize the geopolitical 
ideology topic, the following categories are offered by the author: 
• The role of geopolitical ideology: whether the certain ideology is constructed as 
an advantage or threat; 
• Channels of influence: which ways geopolitical ideology uses to penetrate into 
Gagauzia and Gagauz minds; 
• Local expectations: what the Gagauz narrative expects from geopolitical ideology. 
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To map the external geopolitical influence, the author uses the following table (Table 2) 
as a template:  
Table 2. “Geopolitical ideology in Gagauzia” template 
 
 
Role 
 
 
Opportunity 
 
 
Threat 
 
 
Channels of influence 
 
 
 
Local expectations 
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4. Background information on Gagauzia 
4.1. History of the Gagauz people 
The origins of the Gagauz people, not clarified yet, are still subject to different theories 
and debates. The major theories consider that the Gagauz can be descendants of Seljuks, 
Kipchaks (Cuman), Oghuz, Pechenegs or the synthesis of all of them (Menz, 2007: 123-
124). The ethnogenesis started in the 11th century, when the wave of Pechenegs and 
Oghuz Turks moved into the Balkans, mainly Dobruja, and was heavily influenced by 
advance of the Ottoman Turks in the 14th century (Angeli, 2007).  By 1417 the Turks had 
completed the occupation of Dobruja, which was transformed into an Ottoman sancak. 
Between the 15th and 19th centuries the Ottoman authorities did not distinguish the Gagauz 
from other ethnic groups (Angeli, 2007).  
The ethnonym ‘Gagauz’ was not found in written sources until the early 19th century, 
when the modern history of the community started. Although the migration of the Gagauz 
into the Russian domains kicked off as early as 1768-1774 (Kapaló, 2011: 49), the 1812 
Treaty of Bucharest that ended Russian-Turkish War accelerated this process, by allowing 
the Christian subjects of the Ottoman state to move to Russia. In 1812, new colonists, 
including the Gagauz relocated from eastern Bulgaria to Bessarabia and Budjak (Angeli, 
2007; Bitkova, 2015: 56).  
The first attempts to raise national consciousness and identity among the Gagauz are 
associated with priest Mihail Çakir, who in the early 20th century published books and 
first newspaper in Gagauz (Karanfil, 2013: 110) and translated the entire Orthodox canon 
into Gagauz. Therefore, Çakir is hailed not only as the great educator and enlightener in 
Gagauz history, but also as the founding father of this small community (Kapalό, 2010: 
6; 2011: 70, 72).  
The Russian revolution of 1905-1907 reached Bessarabia and led to a local uprising, 
which culminated with the declaration of the Republic of Comrat in January 1906. The 
self-proclaimed autonomy survived only 5 days, as the Russian troops quickly oppressed 
the insurrection (Tufar et al., 2015). The proclamation was rather symbolic response to 
the Russian authorities and did not imply any nationalistic state. 
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The end of the First World War heralded in Bessarabia the Romanian era, during which 
the conditions of national minorities, including Gagauz worsened as the authorities 
conducted the policy of Romanianization, especially through education system in the 
1920-1930s. However, the school attendance continued to be very low in Bessarabia, 
perhaps as a protest of national minorities, including Gagauz against Romania`s 
assimilation efforts (Wöber, 2013: 8). As a result, the Gagauz were among the least 
educated and impoverished groups in Moldova during the said period (Katchanovski, 
2005: 890). Thus, the Romanian rule is usually associated with oppression and corruption 
in Gagauz memory (Demirdirek, 2000: 67).  
Under Ion Antonescu, the Romanian government even considered the deportation of all 
non-Romanians from the region. A 1942 official governmental report designated the 
Gagauz, alongside other ethnic minorities, as an alien component that represented a great 
threat to Romanian culture and defense. Another plan regarding the Gagauz was even to 
transfer them to Turkey (Kapalό, 2011: 72-73). The afore-told plans were never 
materialized as the Soviets captured Bessarabia first in 1940, then again in 1944. The area 
incorporated into the Soviet Union was divided between the newly formed Moldavian 
SSR and Ukrainian SSR. Such a decision also divided the Gagauz ethnic group, as some 
of them found themselves within the Moldavian SSR, some within the Ukrainian SSR.  
The end of the Second World War did not, however, bring peace to Gagauzia. Many 
Gagauz, as part of labor mobilization, were forcefully sent to Donbas mines and other 
industrial centers of the USSR. Plus, the economic policy introduced in post-war 
Moldavia led to famine in 1946-1947, when some 150,000-200,000 lost their lives 
(Angeli, 2007). The mass deportation of the Gagauz to Siberia took place in 1949. Many 
of the deported could return only after Stalin`s death around 1957 (Karanfil, 2016). Yet, 
these tragic experiences, especially mass starvation, did not translate the political culture 
of the Gagauz into an anti-Soviet or anti-Russian one like in the neighbouring Ukraine 
(Katchanovski, 2005: 890). Instead, the Soviet period is still remembered with generally 
favourable impression (Demirdirek, 2000: 67).  
The post-war period did also deliver some positive changes for the Gagauz, especially in 
terms of modernization and mass literacy. Remarkable event were the introduction of the 
Cyrillic-based Gagauz script and the inclusion of the Gagauz language in the school 
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curriculum in the 1950s. This move necessitated and generated first textbooks in Gagauz 
and gave a strong impetus to the Gagauz written literature (Shornikov, 2009). However, 
the practice was soon discontinued in 1961-1962 allegedly after complaints of many 
Gagauz parents who wanted to preserve Russian as the key language at schools (Schlegel, 
2018: 12-13). The Soviet period thereby led to mass Russification in this region (Chinn 
& Roper, 1998: 90-92; Wöber, 2013: 8).  
 
4.2. Gagauz self-governance in Moldova 
Initially an intellectual movement, Gagauz nationalism received a strong push with the 
Perestroika changes. In 1986, teaching of Gagauz was partially restored at schools. The 
first Gagauz paper Ana Sözü launched two years later became a momentum for the 
Gagauz culture and offered a tribune for local intellectuals. The Gagauz national 
awakening strengthened when Moldovan (identical to Romanian14) was accepted as 
Moldova`s official language in August 1989 and the unionist groups lobbied unification 
with Romania. Moldova`s national minorities became very concerned about such 
developments (Donaj & Grishin, 2015: 48; Kosienkowski, 2017b: 118; Topal, 2013).  
As a result, the Gagauz national movement organized a congress of Gagauz deputies in 
August 1990 and announced about independence from Moldova, the decision to establish 
their own state, the desire to keep their Soviet citizenship and not to accept Moldovan 
citizenship, the election for Gagauz Supreme Soviet (Angeli, 2006: 63-64). In other 
words, the Gagauz Republic was proclaimed as a state separate from Moldova but subject 
only to the Soviet authority (Kosienkowski, 2017a: 293), thus becoming Eurasia`s first 
de facto state (Kosienkowski, 2017b: 116). As stated during the congress, the Gagauz 
movement was not nationalistic; it was designed to enable the Gagauz to survive and live 
together with other ethnic groups (Shornikov, 2009). A couple of weeks later a similar 
quasi-independent Transnistrian state was also proclaimed in Tiraspol (Topal, 2013).  
The decision on Gagauz autonomy was soon annulled by Chișinău as unconstitutional. 
To suppress the tendency in the region, Moldovan Prime Minister Mircea Druc initiated 
                                                          
14 Whether Moldovan is a separate idiom or a dialect of the Romanian language used in Moldova has a 
long history of debates. This linguistic issue is part of a greater controversial question, Moldovan 
identity. 
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in October 1990 what became known as March to Gagauzia: tens of thousands Moldovan 
nationalists proceeded to Gagauzia (Düver, 2009). Counter-mobilization kicked off in the 
region, where locals decided to defend themselves mainly with rebars and other 
improvised means. Human support came from Transnistria. The Russian troops stationed 
nearby also arrived in the region, rolling their tanks across Gagauzia and preventing 
bloodshed (Topal, 2013; Zabarah, 2012: 187). The tensions that lasted several days 
threatened Moldova with a civil war. Although the situation did not escalate into a 
conflict, it accelerated pro-autonomy processes in Gagauzia.  
The Soviet authorities also attempted to regulate the troubled situation in Moldova: in 
November 1990, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev assembled Moldovan, Gagauz and 
Transnistrian leaders. A month later he issued a decree to normalize the situation in 
Moldova, which virtually abolished the Gagauz Republic in exchange of some 
compromises from the Moldovan side (Kendighelean, 2009). 
Towards the end of the year, the Gagauz Republic held its presidential elections and 
elected Stepan Topal for the top office (Angeli, 2007; Topal, 2013). Alongside state 
symbols (flag, coat of arms and national anthem), a bank, a university and even a self-
defence battalion were formed in the entity (Kosienkowski, 2017a: 300). These events 
marked the beginning of the modern Gagauz statehood, which from 1990 to 1994 existed 
as the unrecognized Gagauz Republic. Fortunately, Gagauzia did not become a bloody 
battlefield as happened in Transnistria following Moldova`s independence.  
According to Chinn & Roper (1998: 95), Kosienkowski (2017a: 304, 308) and Zabarah 
(2012: 183, 190), the Gagauz state formation did not follow the path of Transnistria for 
several reasons: firstly, both the leaders and the populace in Gagauzia remained relatively 
unmobilized, while nationalist myths and symbols that could embody Gagauz identity 
were weak; secondly, the 14th Army secured Russia`s direct presence and influence in 
Tiraspol; thirdly, unlike the agriculturally-based economy of Gagauzia, Transnistria, due 
to its industrial facilities, had always been more closely linked to Moscow. Moreover, the 
absence of a patron state did not provide full support to Gagauz independence: Russia 
focused on Transnistria, while Turkey was in favour of Moldova`s territorial integrity. In 
those conditions, as Kosienkowski (2017a: 294) explains, the Gagauz leadership endorsed 
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autonomy or broad self-governance, not full and internationally recognized independence 
from the parent state.  
Therefore, unlike the Transnistrian case, the Gagauz problem was solved after numerous 
meetings between Chișinău and Comrat. As a result, in December 1994, the Parliament 
of Moldova passed the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri), 
awarding the Gagauz with territorial autonomy within Moldova and devolving control of 
some political, cultural and economic issues to the entity. 
One of the major provisions of the document, Article 1.4. reads that in the event of a 
change in the status of sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova, the 
people of Gagauzia possess the right to external self-determination. This clause was 
motivated in the 1990s by the popular narrative of a united Romanian-Moldovan state, of 
which the Gagauz historically had a negative collective memory (Wöber, 2013: 9, 12). 
Gagauz, Russian and Moldovan were accepted as official languages, with the latter two, 
especially Russian set for administrative purposes, according to Article 3.  
As stipulated by the Autonomy Law, the region is headed by Başkan (Governor), the head 
of executive power, who is elected for a four-year term, as are the deputies of the local 
assembly, Halk Topluşu. According to the document, the Başkan must speak Gagauz and 
is also a member ex officio of the Moldovan government.   
The Statute set in motion a series of events in 1995, especially regarding the 
administrative look of the entity: the March referendum incorporated three cities and 
several communes into the Autonomous Gagauz Territory and determined its boundaries 
(Chinn & Roper, 1998: 99; Wöber, 2013: 12).  
What makes the settlement of the Gagauz problem not only successful, but also 
exemplary is that it was achieved directly by conflict sides without any third-party 
mediation. Yet Angeli (2007) and Topal (2013) point to the positive role of Turkey`s 
president Süleyman Demirel in the peaceful and prompt solution of the Gagauz conflict.  
By the time of its adoption, the 1994 Gagauz Autonomy Law seemed more liberal even 
for European standards and concerned some European countries that had ethnic 
minorities. Romania was especially critical of the document, “fearing an atomization of 
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Moldova” and that parallel claims might emerge by Romania`s ethnic minorities, too 
(Schlegel, 2018: 9). 
Since 1994 boundaries between the regional and central competences have been blurry 
and not clarified up to date, while Gagauzia`s scope of self-governance has been allegedly 
reduced over the years (Protsyk & Rigamonti, 2007: 8-9).  
The Kozak memorandum designed in late 2003 during the Transnistria negotiations but 
never materialized proposed a Moldovan federation with both Transnistria and Gagauzia 
as federal subjects with broader rights, such as acquiring membership in international 
organizations, concluding international treaties and establishing representations abroad 
(Berg, 2007: 214-215).  
 
4.3. Current situation of Gagauzia 
After Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013, the 
Gagauz authorities initiated a referendum to display their preferences.  
Organized on February 2, 2014, in light of escalating violence in neighbouring Ukraine, 
the referendum was considered illegal by the Chișinău (Coffey, 2015) but was supported 
by an overwhelming majority of the electorate as the voter turnout was over 70 per cent: 
98.4 per cent of voters favored the Russian-led Customs Union, and 97.2 per cent voted 
against closer EU integration. A similar figure (98 per cent) reasserted Gagauzia’s right 
to self-determination once the political status of the Republic of Moldova changes15.  
Thus, Article 1.4. of the 1994 Autonomy law was charged with a new dimension: the 
provision is not only aimed at Moldova`s hypothetical reunification with Romania, but at 
Moldova’s membership of the EU now. 
According to Donaj and Grishin (2015: 52), the main reasons for this unambiguous result 
of the referendum could be explained by a set of reasons: traditional pro-Russianness of 
local inhabitants; fear of potential unification of Moldova and Romania; concern for 
                                                          
15 Preliminary results of a referendum on February 2, 2014 in Gagauzia (in Russian). February 3, 2014. 
Accessed on May 10, 2019. http://www.gagauzia.md/newsview.php?l=ru&idc=390&id=4790  
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decline in trade with Russia and for restrictions in access to the vital Russian labor market; 
lack of awareness on the EU and on the conditions of European integration. 
While the legal issues around the referendum can be subject to debates, Gagauzia`s 
message, albeit symbolic, to Chișinău, Brussels, and Moscow was clear: the autonomy 
reserves the right to display its geopolitical orientation (Kosienkowski, 2017a; Schlegel, 
2018: 19). Gagauzia, which can “weaken Moldova`s European perspective” (Schwartz, 
2015) was, therefore, called “a bone in Moldova`s throat” (Haines, 2016). But as Donaj 
& Grishin (2015: 52) explain, even if Moldova continues to go westward, Gagauzia has 
no power or resources to protest it. A real secession (backed by an outside force) may, 
however, change the situation. Thus, Rinna (2014) predicts that Gagauzia will likely turn 
into a focal point in the emerging geopolitical struggle for Moldova. 
The 2014 referendum whose result displayed pro-Russian sentiments in Gagauzia is taken 
as a benchmark. This thesis aims to analyse the post-referendum developments in order 
to look into how the interested geopolitical ideologies have been active in Gagauzia and 
how the Gagauz perception of three geopolitical ideologies have evolved since 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
5. Analysis 
5.1. Contemporary Gagauz identity 
This sub-chapter tries to shed light on what it means being Gagauz at present and which 
elements constitute Gagauz identity. The relevant question in this regard asked the 
interviewees about the current situation of the Gagauz language (and culture).  
The evaluation on the Gagauz language by almost all respondents is very pessimistic. 
While discussing the problem, the author heard from his interlocutors such phrasings as 
“not developed” (Sirkeli, 2019), “degradation” (Patraman, 2019), “catastrophic” (Zanet, 
2019), “tragic” and “historic loss” (Dobrov, 2019).  
Despite and during the autonomy, the situation has aggravated. Although the expectations 
for developing the Gagauz language and culture were quite high at the beginning of 
national movement and self-governance (Dobrov, 2019), currently “the Gagauz language 
and culture receive very few input” (Sirkeli, 2019). 
During the intensive Soviet-era Russification of Gagauz cities, the countryside was more 
resistant to this phenomenon (Dobrov, 2019). More intensively used and preserved at 
least as a folk language in the Soviet period, Gagauz has intensively been losing even its 
vernacularity. Home and streets, once the main places that kept Gagauz alive, are rapidly 
turning into Russophone as well. So are the rural areas, where kindergartens and schools 
employ only Russian to bring up younger generations.  
There exist no kindergartens or schools with Gagauz as the main language of instruction. 
Rather, it is taught several hours per week, like a foreign language. The Russian-language 
kindergartens and the current trend of parent-child communication in Russian raise 
concerns that the coming generations might not be able to properly master the Gagauz 
idiom, further risking its existence and hurting the Gagauz identity.  
Therefore, Kissa (2019) and Dobrov (2019) already speak about “disappearance” of the 
Gagauz language. 
In fact, the language is vanishing, to be honest. Because, as you see, we all speak 
Russian here. This mentality is left from the Soviet Union: it did not provide a 
platform to study the Gagauz language, which was learned at home as a rule. For 
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example, I learned it at home with my grandfather. My son speaks Gagauz badly. 
He practically does not speak Gagauz, rather understands. (Kissa, 2019) 
Moreover, spoken Gagauz is further damaged due to lots of loanwords from other 
neighboring languages, a problem voiced by one of the interviewees.  
We did not know many [native] words… And this is why, we managed to get such 
a distorted language, in which 2-3 words are Gagauz, 2-3 Russian, one 
Moldovan... That is, it has become such a distorted language. (Dragoy, 2019) 
That Gagauz has been registered by UNESCO as an endangered language is known in the 
region and was mentioned by Patraman (2019) and Taushanji (2019). Supposed to alert 
the ethnic Gagauz, this status, however, has not been properly coped with over the years. 
Dobrov (2019) puts the responsibility for the situation on the Russified intelligentsia and 
pro-Russian politicians who would employ only Russian for all spheres.  
The state of the Gagauz tongue has been worsening parallel to and due to the dominance 
of the Russian language. In fact, the latter is among the main three elements of the Gagauz 
identity, according to Sirkeli (2019), the other two being Gagauz ethnicity and 
Orthodoxy. He further argues that defending the right for the Russian language was one 
of the founding components for Gagauz autonomy. 
The Gagauz autonomy in its current form was created not only to protect the 
Gagauz language and Gagauz culture... it was established to defend the Russian-
speaking status of the Gagauz. (Sirkeli, 2019) 
Only recently the regional authorities, however, stepped in to bring about some changes. 
In other words, once developed as a folk language without proper intellectual 
development, Gagauz is currently handled in a top-down manner. As the members of 
Halk Topluşu, Kissa (2019), Dragoy (2019) and Jekova (2019) informed about a recent 
legislative attempt to save the language. In order to cultivate the mother tongue, the 
Gagauz officials introduce it to a kindergarten level. The experiment is designed to resist 
the aging of the Gagauz language and to encourage the younger generation to learn it.  
Gagauz identity is also tightly associated with the current territorial autonomy. It was not 
only the Gagauz identity that fostered self-governance; the inverse process has also been 
happening with the autonomy forging Gagauzness. But the autonomy`s present situation 
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is also questioned by several respondents, including Zanet (2019) and Jekova (2019). 
Especially the latter expressed her concern over the alleged reduction of Gagauzia`s 
competences over the years against the backdrop of the absence of boundaries between 
central (Chișinău) and regional authorities (Comrat).  
The way how autonomy was achieved is an important mythmaking about Gagauz 
uniqueness. It is proudly stated (Sirkeli, 2019) that the Gagauz case was probably the only 
conflict in the post-Soviet space that was solved peacefully. This accomplishment is also 
remarkable due to the absence of any intermediaries. This is why, ex-Başkan Formuzal 
once noted that “Gagauzia`s experience in conflict solution is an example for other 
countries”, referring particularly to other territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet space16.  
Romanophobia can also be considered a part of contemporary Gagauz identity. Sirkeli 
(2019) explains how the Romanian rule has left traces in Gagauz collective memory. But 
the Soviet propaganda did also play an active role in constructing the negative Romanian 
image. Having resurfaced in the late 1980s, when the unionist sentiments grew in 
Moldova, this antipathy has transcended into the present and been reconstructed in the 
current realities: 
The old phobia about “the Romanian gendarme” played again. The Soviet Union 
worked very well with its propaganda to form the image of the Romanians as 
fascists. And people began to fear what the Soviet period had cultivated: all these 
horror stories and legends about the Romanian period, when we were considered 
second-class people, when gendarmes beat us, etc. And they [the Soviet Union] 
managed to convince [the Gagauz] of it. People prefer not to talk how we were 
starved by the Soviets in 1946-1947. But minor stories that we were beaten at 
school to make us study well were turned into a whole tragedy. (Sirkeli, 2019) 
The local narrative refers to the period between 1918 and 1940 as the “Romanian 
occupation” (during which Romanian fascists under marshal Antonescu planned to 
annihilate and assimilate the Gagauz) and contraposes it versus “Soviet liberation”17. 
                                                          
16 Экс-башган: опыт Гагаузии в решении конфликта - пример для стран (in Russian). October 15, 
2017. Accessed on April 21, 2019.  https://az.sputniknews.ru/expert/20171015/412329489/gagauzija-
narod-azerbajdzhan-moldova-konflikt.html  
17 Gagauz Resist Moldova’s Embrace of West. January 3, 2018. Accessed on April 23, 2019. 
https://balkaninsight.com/2018/01/03/gagauz-resist-moldova-s-embrace-of-west-01-01-2018-1/  
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The Soviet nostalgia, another integral element of contemporary Gagauzness, is not only 
a purely psychological and mental construct in our case: within the autonomy, it is a 
visible and tangible phenomenon. The major street in the capital town still holds the name 
of Lenin, despite the weak attempts and calls to rename it. The monument to Lenin still 
stands firmly in the same street and in front of the government building that houses both 
Başkan`s office and regional assembly. Memorials dedicated to the Great Patriotic War 
and Afghanistan War can be found in many places across Gagauzia. The 22 June events18 
and 9 May celebrations have been organized here in a solemn manner featuring Russian-
style Immortal Regiment and St. George ribbons in recent years19 20.  
The collective memory in Gagauzia has a positive image of the Soviet period, which is 
characterized with “stability and cheaper prices” (Jekova, 2019) and when people had no 
uncertainty about tomorrow. This nostalgia has become sharper especially when 
contrasting today`s realities:  
There are some people, especially the elderly, who consider themselves part of the 
Soviet Union. They would want to return there as nostalgia is very strong. Because 
the memories of stability are very strong. After the 1990s, we entered a very 
unstable period. Therefore, it is well reflected on the condition of people. And the 
nostalgic past of fairly solid stability still serves as a strong link for them. 
Therefore, there is a portion of people that really wants to feel part of the Soviet 
Union. (Ibrishim, 2019) 
The poor development of Gagauz identity and of the Gagauz autonomy likewise is partly 
explained with the absence of national idea.  
National idea, which would cover the basic directions of the life of this autonomy, 
has not been formulated by politicians over the past years. This mission, this most 
important task has not been formed; thus, unfortunately, we have no national idea 
today. The rest of the problems stems from it… We do not have elementary 
                                                          
18 Руководство Гагаузии почтило память павших в Великой Отечественной войне солдат (in 
Russian). June 22, 2015. Accessed on April 23, 2019. http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=18916  
19 Жители Вулканешт отметили 9 мая Маршем Победы и акцией «Бессмертный полк» (in Russian). 
May 9, 2017. Accessed on April 23, 2019. http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=32878 
20 НТВ Молдова: тысячи жителей Гагаузии отметили День победы (in Russian). May 10, 2018. 
Accessed on April 23, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jGj_KlLT7lQ 
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managerial priorities: how, where to go, what for and what will we do? In 
educational, in cultural, language policies and so on. (Jekova, 2019) 
Different influences are seen rather as opportunities and possibilities that shape multi-
layered Gagauz identity. Interaction with and belonging to several realms can contribute 
to enrich this identity and forge the national idea. As Patraman (2019) offers trilingual 
(Gagauz, Russian and Moldovan) education at school could comprehensively develop a 
younger generation. A double nature (Turkic and Russophone), if transformed into 
trilingual, which seems currently almost impossible in the face of economic poverty and 
with only a limited degree of autonomy, would further make Gagauzia a unique region 
and stimulate a geopolitical confrontation over it more.  
 
5.2. Gagauzia and the Russian world 
The Russian world is represented in general and in Gagauz context by the Russian 
Federation, the gravitational center of this geopolitical framework. In Toal`s model, 
Russia suits the metropolitan state category, which is eager to restore hegemony over its 
former territories by offering the Russian world concept.  
As noted by Sirkeli (2019), the Gagauz generally perceive Russianness as an advantage. 
He earlier mentioned how defending the Russian language was one of the core claims for 
autonomy. Even today, Sirkeli (2019) says that “pro-Russian hysteria is present” in 
Gagauzia. Meanwhile, Kissa (2019) names this advantage “friendship”, by referring to 
Gagauz-Russian relations as “fraternal” and “friendly”. 
Among the channels of this influence comes the Russian language first. The 
underdevelopment of the mother tongue and the heavy Russification both during the 
Soviet and post-Soviet periods, as well as Russian`s status as a lingua franca in this 
ethnically diverse region have turned almost the entire Gagauz population into 
Russophone. In the territory of the Gagauz autonomy, the Russian language is present 
and dominant at all levels and in all spheres. That almost all signs (traffic signs, shops, 
advertisements, monuments) are in Russian were witnessed by the author himself during 
the field trip to Gagauzia. The Russian language is used in all offices across the autonomy 
as officials prefer both oral Russian for communication and written Russian for 
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documentation. The official website of the Gagauz government opens by default in 
Russian, which also contains complete information, although Gagauz, English and 
Romanian versions are also available but usually have partial and poorly translated data. 
Main information portals (gagauzinfo.md, gagauz.md, sabaa.md), as well as Başkan Irina 
Vlah`s webpage also present the entire material in Russian.  
The dominance of the Russian language may be evaluated in a positive light; because 
practically, it provides an opportunity for the Gagauz to the pool of information and 
access to the Russian labor market. 
Russian influence remained here after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
Russian language is also preserved [here]. Everyone is Russia-oriented. Russian 
is a very rich language and it is very cool that our people speak this language. 
(Patraman, 2019) 
The omnipresence of the Russian language creates a good platform for Russian media`s 
penetration into and domination in the region as well. This media constructs an “impact 
on people's minds and moods” (Sirkeli, 2019) and is, first and foremost, about television 
channels “which enjoy unhindered broadcasting here” (Sirkeli, 2019).  
Probably the main reason is that we all speak 100% Russian. All the mass media 
which we obtain information from, everything is in Russian... And this 
propaganda influences thinking. (Dobrov, 2019) 
Currently, Russian propaganda is furthered also on social media. Russian social networks 
such as Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki are quite popular in the region, while Yandex is a 
preferred Russian search engine, as the author himself noted in several cases during his 
communications in Gagauzia.  
Not only TV channels... We should not exclude the role of social media. And social 
media contains a huge amount of pro-Russian accounts, bots, trolls that do their 
work... Russian media, Russian propaganda, we must admit, is quite strong in this. 
(Sirkeli, 2019) 
Interestingly enough, the influence of Orthodoxy is not underlined by any respondent. 
Only after an additional question, Sirkeli (2019) and Dragoy (2019) confirmed the 
influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, which Gagauz Orthodoxy, as well as the 
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Moldovan Orthodoxy, is subordinate to. Yet, neither of the interviewees developed this 
idea further. The author suggests that this situation could be related to the facts that 
Orthodox influence may be invisibly embedded into daily lives and/or the Russian party 
may not be quite active in the Gagauz direction at present.  
The previous sub-chapter already explains Soviet legacy, which is quite alive in 
Gagauzia. Shared history and Soviet nostalgia both transcend into and fuel pro-Russian 
sentiments in the region. This legacy does not only reflect and construct the Soviet period 
as a time of prosperity and stability; it is also based on personal memories.  
You see, after all, we have a common history. For example, I grew up in the Soviet 
Union. When Moldova was formed I was already 10 years old. I remember kopeks, 
I remember rubles. It is left from there. (Kissa, 2019) 
As the Soviet Union was associated with social and economic advancement, as well as 
peaceful inter-ethnic relations, the Gagauz were reluctant to leave the USSR and did not 
welcome its downfall. This positive image may take its roots even from the pre-Soviet 
times: in collective memory Russian friendship dates back to the turn of the 18th century, 
when the Christian Gagauz found asylum in the Orthodox Russian state, where they were 
provided with lands and privileges, including tax and military service exemption.  
Dragoy (2019) also confirms that a “red” Gagauzia still likes to link itself with Russia. 
While the Romanian period has been memorized as a negative experience, the Russian / 
Soviet tragedies are either skipped or not constructed as such: hence, in these contexts, 
forgetting is a usual trend and preferred to remembrance.  
The Russian influence has always been and remains a very large influence on the 
Gagauz, on the minds. Despite the fact that it was in the Soviet Union, in 1946-
1947, when the artificial famine was created in Moldova; most people died in the 
south. According to some data, up to 50% of the population passed away. Despite 
this tragedy, it is surprising that, even those who were expelled and returned, their 
children, they all praise the Soviet Union, Soviet power, Communist ideology, 
Lenin, Leninism, etc. (Dobrov, 2019) 
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Avoiding any negatory memory about the Soviet period is not only related to Soviet 
nostalgia. Fearing Russia or fearing to lose Russia`s friendship also blocks such 
initiatives.  
My colleague and I initiated a draft on designating a special Day of Remembrance 
for the Victims of Famine. And what was the reaction? Terrible. Why? Because 
we cannot quarrel with Russia. “You offer it because you want to embroil us with 
Russia,” some said. And we cannot quarrel with Russia in any way. (Jekova, 
2019) 
Having covered several channels of the Russian influence, which also correspond to four 
key parameters that construct Russianness, this thesis can refer to the Russianness table 
again (see Table 3):  
Table 3. Gagauz according to Russianness parameters  
 
Parameters of 
Russianness 
 
Ethnic Russians in 
the Near 
Abroad 
 
      Non-Russian 
former Soviet   
citizens 
 
Global Russians 
Russian 
language 
Yes Yes Yes 
Russian 
ethnicity 
Yes No Irrelevant 
Orthodox 
Church 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Soviet 
legacy 
Yes Yes Irrelevant 
 
 
In other words, the Gagauz, although ethnically non-Russian, contain other important 
elements of Russianness constructed by the Russian world ideology: Russian language, 
Orthodoxy and Soviet heritage. 
The afore-mentioned parameters, as well as big opportunities in a vast territory, have also 
set Russia as the major destination for Gagauz emigration fostered by the poor economic 
situation in the autonomy. The frequent contacts with and the remittances from Russia 
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not only contribute to daily lives of the Gagauz (as well as the of the whole autonomy) 
financially, but also strengthen the overall pro-Russian sympathy.  
Russia continues to remain an important and huge market for Gagauz products, mainly 
agricultural and viticultural. Even when Russia banned some Moldovan imports in 
response to Moldova's EU Association Agreement, Gagauzia received privileges and 
permission to bypass these restrictions, a fact acknowledged by Patraman (2019).  
Another respondent, Todur Zanet (2019), brings to scene politicians as one of the 
channels. According to him, Russian influence or threat is constructed and/or transmitted 
by local political figures, who like to use the Russian factor for their own dividends. 
Despite fueling and skillfully using the pro-Russian sentiments inside Gagauzia, they do, 
however, cooperate with and eagerly accept financial aid from other centers of power.  
The image of Russia can also be cemented by the prestige of Russian political leaders, 
especially Vladimir Putin, who is respected here a lot, although he may be criticized in 
his own country:  
On the Internet, sometimes I see that they don’t like Putin in Moscow or in St. 
Petersburg, that there are many opposition forces in Russia. If you raise such an 
issue before the Gagauz, there would be no question at all. Here, people are just 
fond of him. That is, Russia`s influence here is still dominant. (Dobrov, 2019) 
Personification of Russian leader(s) with Russia itself not only stems from domination of 
the Russian influence but strengthens this influence as well. This concept can further be 
confirmed by the “photo with a Russian leader” narrative prevalent in Gagauzia. 
According to this well-spread stereotype, “a photo with Putin can bring manifold 
dividends” (Jekova, 2019) to a local politician. The author himself heard this idea from 
various persons during off-record and informal conversations in Comrat and in Chișinău.  
Indeed, billboards and slogans that promote stronger ties with Russia allegedly 
contributed a lot to the election of the incumbent Başkan Irina Vlah in 2015. Over the 
years, the information on her meetings with Russian leadership, photos of her handshakes 
with Putin and other Russian officials are believed to add capital into her popularity. 
Referring back to the idea above, the pro-Russian sentiments are constructed and 
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strengthened by the local ruling elite (by using “Russia is our strategic partner”-type 
slogans) and masterly manipulated for political gains.  
Despite Gagauzia`s being and wanting a pro-Russian platform, Russia in her turn does 
not provide any substantial aid to keep or (re-)integrate this corner into the Russian world. 
In reference to (much expected) Russian assistance, almost all the interlocutors would use 
such terms as “none”, “words only”, “insignificant”, “minor”, which include “hearing 
aids, second-hand cars” (Sirkeli, 2019), “books” (Zanet, 2019), “Bible in Gagauz” 
(Dragoy, 2019). This assistance seems miserable especially when comparing with the 
input that comes from other sources of power, namely Turkey and the EU. 
Although by and large there is not much help from there [Russia]. If you compare 
it with that of Turkey… Look how much Turkey helps. (Kissa, 2019) 
According to the official data, between 2016-2018 Gagauzia was a recipient of Russia`s 
humanitarian aid worth 25 million Moldovan leu21 (approximately 1.25 million euro); it 
was almost three times less than European assistance in 2016. Russian assistance included 
mainly agricultural technology, vehicles, medial and sports equipment22 23. A big portion 
of financial aid was used to purchase books for school libraries and to provide stipends 
for students. Moreover, Gagauzia gained a quota of free operations for ten people in 
Russian hospitals24. 
While substantial help comes from other sources, Gagauzia undergoes the “free of 
charge” Russification (Dobrov, 2019). Such a situation irritates some of the interviewees, 
one of whom (Dragoy, 2019) used Medvedev`s catchphrase “There is no money, but you 
hold on”25 in order to explain Russia`s attitude to the region.  
                                                          
21 Вадим Чебан - Корнелу Дуднику: Россия инвестировала в Гагаузию не 20 евро, а 25 миллионов 
леев (in Russian). January 31, 2019. Accessed on April 23, 2019. 
http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=45005  
22 Санкт-Петербург передал Гагаузии гуманитарную помощь стоимостью в 10 миллионов леев (in 
Russian).  February 13, 2016. Accessed on April 23, 2019. 
http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=23317  
23 Итоги социально-экономического развития АТО Гагаузии, 2016 (in Russian). Accessed on April 22, 
2019. https://investgagauzia.md/itogi-sots-ekon-razvitiya/ 
24 Сердцу не прикажешь: как пророссийски настроенная автономия в составе Молдовы изо всех 
сил пытается не замечать ЕС (in Russian). March 19, 2018. Accessed on April 22, 2019. 
http://www.zdg.md/ru/?p=18148  
25 Медведев пенсионерам в Крыму: денег нет, но вы держитесь (in Russian). May 24, 2016. Accessed 
on May 9, 2019. https://www.svoboda.org/a/27754387.html  
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The pro-Russian Gagauz eagerly expected to catch any attention of Russia particularly in 
the aftermath of the 2014 referendum. In general, the historic event is not only a 
benchmark for the Gagauz that reflected their position, but also a reference point for 
multiple contexts.  
And what is the most surprising? It turned out that the Russian Federation did not 
respond. It even very faintly highlighted [the referendum] in its information 
resources... Just once or twice on the central channels. (Patraman, 2019) 
Poor reaction from Russia was followed by poor actions. The pro-Russian choice of 
people was not repaid. Obviously, almost nothing has changed in Russia`s attitude 
towards the region: humanitarian and financial assistance, trade, cooperation has 
remained almost the same and not increased since the referendum. Even if some actions 
have been done, they are not so visible and have not produced any tangible results. 
Russia would send some humanitarian aid even before [the referendum], and it 
has continued to act the same way [afterwards]. No tight cooperation, which 
media or officials had announced has happened… [The authorities claim that] 
they have concluded 50 agreements. But the life of people is not improving. If the 
economy is growing, who benefits from it? Maybe there are some entrepreneurs 
who export fruits [to Russia]. But I do not see that the life of an average man has 
improved by the agreements signed with Russia. (Patraman, 2019) 
The opinion of another respondent in this regard is sharp and more straightforward:  
Russia does not need Gagauzia at all. The main thing Russia needs is Transnistria. 
And it [Russia] has taken it. (Zanet, 2019) 
During her visit to Moscow in October 2017, Irina Vlah met with the representatives of 
the Russkiy Mir Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo and asked for more aid, especially 
in the sphere of education in terms of equipment, textbooks26. It seems that Russia started 
                                                          
26 Фонд «Русский мир» и Россотрудничество активизируют сотрудничество с Гагаузией (in Russian). 
October 24, 2017. Accessed on April 23, 2019. http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=36250  
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to activate its activities in Gagauzia (and Transnistria). The most recent information in 
April 2019: Rossotrudnichestvo agreed to soon open a contact point in Gagauzia27. 
In another set of views, Russian influence is seen or understood as a threat. These views 
are, however, presented rather as a divisive phenomenon within the society: educated 
versus uneducated, urban versus rural. Moreover, the Russian threat is constructed 
through the historical prism, by referring to the bitter experience of the past usually unsaid 
and avoided by the contemporary generation.  
People less educated or from rural areas feel it as an advantage. The more 
educated ones opine vice versa and recall, for example, the 1947-1947, from 
which many, including myself suffered. (Taushanji, 2019) 
While Gagauz emigration to and remittances from Russia have already been explained as 
one of the pillars of the Russian influence in Gagauzia, they can also bring negative 
experience as well.  
Many people return from Russia and shout that they will never go there again. 
Just like my relative, who had lived there for 18-20 years and had his own 
business. But he got stripped so badly there that he came back with nothing. For 
him, the words ‘Russia’, ‘Putin’ sound so abusive today. (Dragoy, 2019) 
Although the stories like the one above narrate personal experience and may probably not 
be generalized, they can still refer to the values (or lack of the values), as well as the level 
of development Russia represents for the Gagauz.  
At the same time, a neutral stance to the Russian influence is also available:  
In general, Russia`s influence at the moment is very strong. This is neither good 
nor bad. It [Russia`s influence] is just present. (Patraman, 2019) 
Yet, he is also against labelling this influence as a threat, again by pointing to historical 
connections and friendly relations.  
                                                          
27 Наверстать упущенное: Россотрудничество открывает филиалы в Гагаузии и Приднестровье (in 
Russian). April 14, 2019. Accessed on April 23, 2019. http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=46317  
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Of course, no one feels a threat. Because there is none. And because historically 
Russia has been friendly to us. Especially over the last historical period. Since the 
1970s. (Patraman, 2019) 
By the end of this sub-chapter, the template offered by the author as the map of Russian 
influence may take the following form (Table 4):  
 
Table 4. Russian world in Gagauzia 
 
 
 
Role 
 
Opportunity 
Fraternity and friendship 
Historical connections (czarist- and Soviet-era positive 
memory) 
Threat 
Uneducated masses (as a receiver of Russian influence) 
Historical experience (famine, deportation) 
 
 
 
Channels of influence 
 
Russian language 
Russian Orthodox Church 
Shared history / Soviet nostalgia 
Mass media and social media 
Local and Russian politicians 
Migrant workers and remittance 
 
Local expectations 
 
More attention from Russia 
Closer cooperation 
Proper aid 
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5.3. Gagauzia and Pan-Turkism  
As this sub-chapter examines Gagauzia vis-à-vis Pan-Turkism, the latter is scrutinized 
and understood as mainly Turkish influence, given that Turkey is currently the main actor 
and driver of the Turkic ideology and geographically near Gagauzia. Therefore, in this 
part Turkey also represents Turkic influence and fits Toal`s kin power category.  
Ethno-linguistic kinship is the basis for the present Gagauz-Turkish relations. Both 
belong to the Oghuz branch of the Turkic family, which make them, along with 
Azerbaijani and Turkmen also, mutually intelligible to some extent. Therefore, the 
Gagauz-Turkish ties are based, first and foremost, on their Turkic nature.  
I always say that I can speak with the Turks... Our languages are identical, not 
100%. But 70% can be spoken and understood. (Kissa, 2019) 
Many history books and museums (e.g., Comrat and Beșalma museums, which the author 
himself visited), too, report about the Turkic origin of the Gagauz and their movement to 
South-eastern Europe a millennium ago. At the same time, the absence of historical 
evidence about Gagauz history until the 19th century has embedded into Gagauz 
consciousness the mythologized and romanticized versions of the Turkic roots. 
Kissa (2019), Dobrov (2019) and Dragoy (2019) refer to Gagauz-Turkish relations as 
“brotherly”, which is not surprising at least for the author. In general, Pan-Turkism, as a 
concept, has been promoted as the brotherhood of Turkic ethnic groups. Within the Oghuz 
branch, the fraternal nature of Turkey`s attitude toward others has especially been more 
obvious, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union. For instance, the context of 
Azerbaijani-Turkish relations is no more evaluated as those of two neighboring countries. 
This bond has been developed into a trans-national concept known as “One Nation – Two 
States”, a unique phenomenon in international system.  
At the same time, the Gagauz do not want to feel inferior in this bilateral relationship.  
We generally believe that the Turks are our brothers. If you ask anyone, [they] 
will say that they believe that the Turks are our brothers. Of course, we are not 
going to call who is the elder brother, who is the younger. It is not appropriate. 
In any case, we believe that we are of the same blood as the Turks. It is not even 
discussed. (Dragoy, 2019) 
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In some cases, the Gagauz, who do not want to feel inferior due to their small size and to 
the status of recipient of Turkish aid, may construct a myth of superiority. In such cases, 
the emphasis is usually put on antiquity of the Gagauz language.  
If we speak today Gagauz, our pure language, a Turk would hear and say: “You 
speak like ancient Turks, like our ancestors.” (Dragoy, 2019) (The boldly 
highlighted words were said in Gagauz)  
This myth was also confirmed by Dobrov (2019) and Patraman (2019), with the latter 
stating that it was Gagauz that was taken as the basis for contemporary Turkish during 
the language reform under Atatürk.  
The present Turkish soft power is projected mainly in “constructions and investments” 
(Sirkeli, 2019) and “infrastructure projects” (Dobrov, 2019). These projects, huge and 
visible, are carried out by TİKA and Turkish private sector. One of Turkey`s main tools 
in the region, TİKA, has carried out more than 400 projects all over Moldova, including 
Gagauzia since 1994.  
In recent years, TİKA built new housing facilities for 15 families, which had suffered 
from the Ceadîr-Lunga flood (275,000 euro), a playground in Vulcănești (21,000 euro), 
a football field in Congaz (25,000 euro), an artesian well in Congaz (41,500 euro), 
reconstructed a kindergarten in Copceac (397,000 euro), equipped the Süleyman Demirel 
kindergarten (88,000 euro), carried out the cleaning of the riverbed of the Stratan River 
(appr. 150,000 euro)28. The organization repaired the government building, the Ceadîr-
Lunga stadium, modernized the Gagauz Radio and Television facilities and the 
Vulcănești hospital29. Only in 2016, the total aid delivered to Gagauziya via TİKA 
equalled to 21 million Moldovan leu (approx. 1 million euro)30. The most recent 
agreement between the governments of Turkey and Gagauzia stipulates the construction 
of a 10-million-euro stadium in Comrat31.  
                                                          
28 Итоги социально-экономического развития АТО Гагаузии, 2016 (in Russian). Accessed on April 22, 
2019. https://investgagauzia.md/itogi-sots-ekon-razvitiya/  
29 TIKA projects and activities in Moldova 1992-2013. Accessed on April 24, 2019. 
https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/moldova.pdf  
30 Отчет Башкана Гагаузии о проделанной работе за 2016 год (in Russian). Accessed on April 22, 
2019. http://vlah.md/index.php?newsid=1043  
31 Турецкие инвестиции в строительство нового стадиона в Комрате составят 10 миллионов евро 
(in Russian). January 11, 2019. Accessed on April 21, 2019. 
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Turkish businesspeople are also active in and frequently visit the region. Four Turkish 
fabric manufacturing factories operate in Gagauzia32. In 2016, Turkey`s Gebze industrial 
zone agreed in 2016 to develop a similar industrial park in the autonomy33, while a 2-
million-dollar investment was allocated for the construction of a brand-new hotel in 
Comrat34 the next year.  
The author himself witnessed the infrastructure facilities such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
Retirement House, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk public library, Altındağ Youth Center which 
have been built by the Turks in Comrat in recent years.  
Turkish projects are also appraised for the way they are implemented. Kissa (2019) and 
Zanet (2019) appreciate that the Turkish party does not simply provide finances. By 
learning the needs and demands of Gagauzia, Turkey itself designs and implements 
development projects. Such an approach is necessary, helpful and valuable in terms of 
“avoiding corruption” (Kissa, 2019; Zanet, 2019). 
Turkey`s attention to Gagauzia and attempts to further emphasize the position of 
Gagauzia within the Turkic world is indicated by regular visits of Turkish officials: 
Turkish ambassadors to Moldova visit the region quite often, according to Ibrishim 
(2019). So do high-ranking officials from Ankara: for instance, Prime Minister Binali 
Yıldırım and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in May 201735. The most remarkable 
of such visits was realized in October 2018, when Turkey`s President Recep Tayyib 
                                                          
http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=44652  
32 Рецепт властей: как выживает Гагаузия (in Russian). April 3, 2018. Accessed on April 21, 2019. 
https://ru.sputnik.md/economics/20180403/18296154/gagauzia-business.html  
33 Администрация турецкой промзоны GEBZE поможет в разработке генплана развития 
индустриального парка Комрата (in Russian). November 9, 2016. Accessed on April 22, 2019. 
http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=29334  
34 В столице Гагаузии начато строительство отеля Chateu Komrat: турецкие инвестиции составят 2 
млн долларов (in Russian). May 6, 2017. Accessed on April 21, 2019.  
http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=32860  
35 Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu accompanied Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım during his visit to 
Moldova (in Turkish). May 5, 2017. Accessed on April 21, 2019.  
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-cavusoglunun-moldova-ziyareti_en.en.mfa  
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Erdoğan attended Comrat36 and delivered a speech, in which he referred to the Turkic 
world as a 300-million-family37.  
Apart from social projects, Turkey actively uses cultural and educational tools. Two of 
several Turkish schools across Moldova are located within Gagauzia. The “high quality” 
of the education with more emphasis on “English and natural sciences” makes these 
schools quite “popular” in Gagauzia (Sirkeli, 2019). One of the schools is controlled by 
the Turkish government, the other by Gülen network now outlawed in Turkey.  
The Comrat State University is another target of Turkish investments. The Turkish 
Student Center (Ibrishim, 2019) has been operating since 200938, while Turkish language 
courses are being regularly held at the university and Atatürk Public Library. The Turkish 
Language and Literature Department was launched at the university in January 201939. 
The university and library are actively supplied with Turkey-printed books, usually from 
the Yunus Emre Institute and TİKA.  
The Turkish influence is transmitted also through Turkish lecturers dispatched from 
Turkey to work at university and gymnasia, as well as through Turkish students who 
usually come to learn Russian (sic) at the Comrat State University.  
In addition, we have Turkish students at the university. They organize an 
environment for communication. Turkish language is becoming more active. 
(Ibrishim, 2019) 
Turkey wants to exert its influence by actively promoting the Gagauz language. It is, for 
instance, confirmed by Kissa (2019), who says that the Turks usually advice the Gagauz 
to speak their mother tongue. He further narrates a personal story:  
                                                          
36 Moldova'da Başkan Erdoğan'a coşkulu karşılama (in Turkish). October 18, 2018. Accessed on April 21, 
2019. https://www.sabah.com.tr/galeri/dunya/moldovada-baskan-erdogana-coskulu-karsilama  
37 Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: 300 milyonluk büyük bir aileyiz (in Turkish). October 18, 2018. Accessed on 
April 21, 2019. https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/erdogan-gagavuzyada-konusuyor-3402993  
38 Türk Öğrencileri Merkezi (in English, Russian, Turkish). Accessed on April 22, 2019. 
https://kdu.md/en/struktura-universiteta/tsentry/turetskij-tsentr  
39 Bartın Üniversitesi Gagauzya'da 'Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü' Açılmasına Destek Verdi (in Turkish). 
January 30, 2019. Accessed on April 22, 2019  
https://www.haberler.com/bartin-universitesi-gagauzya-da-turk-dili-ve-11692348-haberi/  
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I admired what the Turkish Ambassador once said to me. I write him a[n official] 
letter to ask for some assistance... And he takes the paper and says to me, in 
Russian: “I do not understand Russian.”  
“Write me in Moldovan, Gagauz or Turkish,” says he. And it is right. This is in 
his subconscious: “You can write in Gagauz. Maybe poorly, not so well, with some 
mistakes. But just write.” His words touched me. And he was right. 
… Now I always try to write in Gagauz or Moldovan… But we need to get a bit 
away from the Russian language. We speak it, we love it [Russian]. But we still 
have to realize our own [language]. (Kissa, 2019) 
In the Gagauz narrative, Turkey may also be personified. Süleyman Demirel, who served 
as Turkey`s president in 1993-2000, is still admired by the Gagauz, for his attention to 
Gagauzia in the 1990s. Turkish leader visited and embraced Gagauzia, provided 
substantial support and then mediated between Chișinău and Comrat (Sirkeli, 2019; 
Taushanji, 2019). This admiration was monumentalized, when Demirel`s bust was 
unveiled in front of the Comrat State University, in the Lane of Honor that also hosts the 
monuments to several prominent Gagauz. A gymnasium-kindergarten complex in Comrat 
is also named after Demirel. Moreover, the monument to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has 
been erected beside TIKA-built public library.  
This sympathy is also transcending to the current leadership. The visit of Turkey`s 
incumbent president Erdoğan in September 2018 boosted this respect.  
We recently hosted Turkish president. He delivered a speech in the square. And 
people came there just to listen to him. They were not pushed. So much help has 
been provided [by Turkey] and our people appreciate it. (Kissa, 2019) 
While suspicious attitude of the Gagauz to the Turks due to the religious difference are 
articulated in academic and analytical pieces, the author did not feel it during his field 
trip. In the interviews, the religious theme was mentioned several times. Some 
interlocutors are quite happy that they are “not forced to convert to Islam” (Kissa, 2019; 
Manjul, 2019), that the Turks “do not build mosques” in Gagauzia (Manjul, 2019) and 
even invite the Gagauz to preserve what makes them Gagauz:  
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I really like what Erdoğan said in his speech: “Preserve your language and 
religion”. He did not say: “Become Muslim. Speak Turkish.” He clearly put it: 
“Preserve your language and religion”. (Zanet, 2019) (The boldly highlighted 
words were said in Turkish) 
Turkey also attempts to promote its soft power through mass media. The most obvious 
policy is the re-broadcasting of Turkish TV channels on Gagauz Radio and Television. 
However, these attempts have not worked, according to Sirkeli (2019), who says that 
nobody watches Turkish TV channels. However, Ibrishim (2019) claims that the latter 
may have an audience, especially among the Gagauz, who have been to Turkey.  
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that, Turkey, too, is a key destination for Gagauz 
emigrants, especially female migrant workers. These migrants not only become part of 
the Turkic world, but also enrich Gagauz language and culture with Turkish elements. 
[T]hose who have been there [in Turkey] as migrants, bring the language when 
they return.  That is, the Gagauz language is enriched with elements of Turkish, 
which are entered into circulation. These are simple people who use Turkish 
words in everyday life. They start watching Turkish channels. They bring some 
elements of Turkish culture. (Ibrishim, 2019) 
At the same time, the arrival of Turkish elements in Gagauz landscape may become a 
source of concern, to some extent. The pure Gagauz words are replaced by their Turkish 
alternatives. As a result, the leadership and average citizens Turkify both oral and written 
Gagauz. Thus, Zanet (2019) concludes that the penetration of the Turkish vocabulary and 
pronounciation into Gagauz additionally contributes to the degradation of the latter. But 
this is not Turkey`s policy, as it is happening mostly at vernacular level.  
Other representatives of the Gagauz intelligentsia cherish serious expectations from 
Turkey, whose social and cultural projects do not seem satisfactory. Referring to the 
current state of the Gagauz language, Dobrov (2019) calls on for more efforts from 
Turkey for salvation of his mother tongue.  
Neither previous presidents, including Demirel nor the current President 
Erdoğan, understands our tragedy. And the tragedy is the disappearance of [our] 
language. They [the Turks] are ready to invest huge money in the construction of 
68 
 
buildings. No penny has been invested in the development of the [Gagauz] 
language. (Dobrov, 2019) 
Patraman (2019) also thinks that the Gagauz language should be saved by Turkey. 
Because by losing their mother tongue, the Gagauz will lose their Turkic ethnicity and 
Turkey will lose its influence. This idea points out to how ethnicity and language may 
correlate in this part of the world and shows how identity may be used for practical gain: 
Why there is no proposal on investment in the language issue is not clear for me. 
I do not think that the Republic of Turkey would refuse. After all, the Turkish 
influence is present here because we are a Turkic people. If we cease to be a 
Turkic people and cease to speak the mother tongue, then what kind of Turkish 
influence, in principle, can we talk about? That is, the influence would also be 
lost. (Patraman, 2019) 
In case Gagauz cannot be saved, a radical solution offers to introduce Turkish in 
Gagauzia. Dobrov (2019) and Dragoy (2019) reckon that Turkish, as a kin Oghuz 
language, can save Turkicness of the Gagauz if intensively taught within the autonomy.  
Dragoy (2019) also wants more cooperation from the Turkish party. He proposes a 
practical advice: more scholarships should be allocated from Turkey to attract more 
students to go to Turkey and then to return to the homeland. This policy would not only 
gain Gagauzia skilled human resources but also increase pro-Turkish sentiments here.  
Turkey is also seen as a protector against the independence of Moldova.  
We see them [the Turks] as protectors. If someone encroaches the independence 
of the Republic of Moldova... Therefore, in the Turks, we have always been looking 
for and will continue to look for a partner and a defender. (Dragoy, 2019) 
To summarize the findings of the fieldwork, the relevant template is filled in as follows 
at the end of this sub-chapter (see Table 5).  
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Table 5. Pan-Turkism in Gagauzia 
 
 
 
Role 
 
Opportunity 
Fraternity (ethno-linguistic affiliation and kinship) 
Threat 
Language (Turkish contributes to the demise of Gagauz) 
Religion (this threat is becoming weaker) 
 
 
 
Channels of influence 
 
Development aid and investment (infrastructure 
construction, substantial help, less corruption) 
Language 
Education and culture (Turkish schools, language courses, 
books, students and lecturers) 
Migrants 
Frequent visits of Turkish officials (president, prime 
minister, ambassador) 
Sympathy toward Turkish leaders 
 
Local expectations 
 
Protection of Turkicness (revival of the Gagauz language, 
intensive Turkish classes) 
Education 
Protection of the autonomy 
 
5.4. Gagauzia and EU normative power  
For some time, the EU, as an external normative power (Toal`s model) is involved in 
Gagauzia indirectly, mainly through the former`s engagement with Moldova, a 
nationalizing parent state. As already stated, the EU (institutions, NGOs and individual 
states) decided to contact with Gagauzia in a straight manner, especially in the aftermath 
of the 2014 referendum, in order to alter the negative attitude in the region towards the 
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EU. Thus, the EU narrative is not only the recent phenomenon, but also a changing one 
in the Gagauz context.  
“If we met about 10 years ago, I would naturally say that a greater percentage” was pro-
Russian, started Dragoy (2019) when answering the author`s question.  
…After the European Union opened the borders and we began to travel more 
(tourism, leisure, work), people`s thoughts also started to change. And the 
percentage, 100%, that was once with Russia today… is no more. But the eastern 
vector is still dominating. (Dragoy, 2019) 
The Gagauz imagination of the EU (and the Western world in general) is usually negative, 
which was mainly constructed prior to the 2014 referendum. Sirkeli (2019) finds two 
major sources of this attitude. He firstly blames the Moldovan side for not clearly 
explaining to the masses, including the Gagauz the essence of the European integration.  
Here our Moldovan leadership is responsible. Because in 2009 the Moldovan 
authorities and politicians should have spoken of how the process really is, 
instead of speaking about European integration. In other words, the Association 
Agreement with the European Union says nothing about the prospects for 
membership and that Moldova will join the European Union. It is simply an 
association agreement, which stipulates that Moldova should bring some spheres 
to certain standards. Yet, everyone was chanting that we would soon enter the 
European Union. And all the politicians claimed that we would become a full EU 
member by 2020-2025. (Sirkeli, 2019) 
All the speculations in Chișinău around European integration seem to damage not only 
the process itself, but also the EU`s image in the eyes of the Gagauz. Thus, as Sirkeli 
(2019) explains, the phrase ‘European integration’ has become very invective, just as the 
term ‘democracy’ was discredited in the post-Soviet space in early 1990s.  
The negative EU image has also been constructed by Russian propaganda and (pro-
Russian) politicians, while pro-Russian population of Gagauzia easily absorb these ideas 
(Sirkeli 2019). The Russian propaganda machine that creates myths on the EU has been 
influential here, associating the EU with the gay movement:  
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Having seen it [the pro-EU movement of Moldova], the Russians said: "Guys, you 
want European integration and membership? We will now explain to your citizens 
what it means.” Thus, they started narrating that Europe was full of gays and that 
they would flow into Gagauzia... That your men would wear skirts and put on 
earrings, that your children would be taken away from you and given to gay 
families for upbringing. That you would be forbidden to keep pets and to slaughter 
animals at home because of some standards. All these horror stories were quickly 
cultivated. (Sirkeli, 2019) 
As seen, the major focus of this mythmaking touched on what could threaten the 
traditional lifestyle of the Gagauz.  
The Gagauz believe that Europe is an evil, from which it is necessary to run away. 
They were convinced of it by those politicians who won the last few elections, 
either parliamentary or local. Because this is a profitable trick: “There are gays, 
we do not want to go there”. (Jekova, 2019) 
However, the 2014 referendum that produced the anti-European and pro-Russian output 
brought some tangible results, too. The European political institutions and academic 
circles started paying more attention to this region. More and more scholarly pieces and 
analytical articles appeared, while the European organizations initiated several projects 
which directly aimed at Gagauzia. Previously, the European projects would reach (or not 
reach) Gagauzia via Chișinău. 
The anti-European hysteria which peaked on the eve of the referendum was replaced with 
opened borders and established contacts. With the unlocking of the borders between the 
EU and Moldova after the introduction of visa-free regime, the attitude towards Europe 
started changing (Sirkeli, 2019; Kissa, 2019; Dobrov, 2019; Ibrishim, 2019).  
The direct experience of higher living standards in the West, to which “we, the Gagauz, 
should strive for” (Dobrov, 2019) positively influence the Gagauz world outlook. 
Therefore, Sirkeli (2019) considers that it is necessary to focus on the process of the 
European integration rather than EU membership. More actions on bringing Moldova to 
European standards and less talk about the EU membership would be a better policy for 
Europeanizing Moldova, including Gagauzia:  
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As for the EU, firstly, there is no need to tell people fairy tales. We can forget 
about EU membership for 50 years. The EU does not want this in the first place. 
And we are not ready for this. Thus, to say that Moldova will enter the EU is far 
from reality. These questions, in my opinion, should not be discussed at all. 
Yes, we are on the path of European integration in the sense that we are complying 
with the terms of the association agreement and conducting reforms. 
If you ask a person, “Do you want to enter the European Union?”, they will 
certainly answer “no”. If you ask them “Do you want a standard of living like in 
Europe?”, they will say “yes”. If you ask them “Do you want justice or good 
roads?”, they will say “yes”. Just like in Europe. Thus, you do not need to ask 
them about Euro-integration with the present conditions. We need economic 
development, normal judicial system, anti-corruption reforms. Rather than 
speaking of Euro-integration, you will do what is part of Euro-integration. People 
themselves will understand everything perfectly. (Sirkeli, 2019) 
The EU investments are accepted in Gagauzia without any problems as infrastructure 
projects are funded by the Europeans (Sirkeli, 2019; Dragoy, 2019). Direct European 
projects and investments help to change the narratives, says Kissa (2019), bringing as an 
example his own native settlement:  
Europe began to implement projects in Gagauzia directly through our 
government. The referendum gave impetus to their projects, so they began 
allocating money here. For example, in my village, the locals already speak very 
well about Europe as they know who built the roads and the water system, where 
the money came from. Therefore, narrative is changing to positive. (Kissa, 2019) 
The big scope of European projects and grants, which are accepted by the Gagauz 
authorities with a pleasure, is not fully advertised in Gagauzia, according to Jekova 
(2019), in order to downplay the European influence and maintain pro-Russian loyalty.   
Indeed, both the EU and its structures have been paying more attention to the post-
referendum Gagauzia. Several large-scale projects funded by the EU have been 
implemented in the region: 
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The 2016-2018 SARD (Support for agriculture and rural development in ATU Gagauzia 
and Taraclia) Programme had a budget of 6.5 million euro provided by the European 
Union. Designed to support local entrepreneurship and development of the agro-food 
sector, the programme was also supposed to boost cooperation among the central and 
local authorities and regional organizations in order to uphold regional and national 
social-economic development40. Another EU-funded project is GAMCON, which 
functioned in 2017-2019 through a system of trainings and educational visits. The project 
financed over 20 ideas in Gagauzia, including the opening of a photo studio, a music 
studio, a cinema hall, recreation areas, schools of robotics. The overall budget was 
850,000 euro41, with grants ranging between 5,000 euro and 10,000 euro for each 
project42. A third programme with a total budget 600,000 euro supports civil society 
organizations in Gagauzia between 2017-201943. In March 2018, a 3-million-euro EU 
program on support of local authorities was officially launched44. 
The EU normative power can also be looked into through a prism of the individual 
activities of the EU member-states.  
Separate activities of EU countries and non-governmental organizations should also be 
considered. For instance, Sweden supports the activities of CMI, a Finnish-based 
organization, which facilitates dialogue and cooperation between the Parliament of 
Moldova and the authorities of Gagauzia45. Dozens of kindergartens in Gagauzia were 
                                                          
40 Support for agriculture and rural development in ATU Gagauzia and Taraclia. Accessed on April 22, 
2019. http://sard.md/en/?page_id=1040  
41 В Гагаузии стартовал молодежный проект GAMCON с бюджетом в 850 тысяч евро (in Russian). 
April 7, 2019. Accessed on April 22, 2019. http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=32309  
42 Проект GAMCON объявляет конкурс на финансирование гражданских инициатив (in Russian). 
October 16, 2017. Accessed on April 22, 2019. http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=36082  
43 Strengthening civil society in ATU Gagauzia. Accessed on April 22, 2019. 
https://www.eu4moldova.md/en/content/strengthening-civil-society-atu-gagauzia  
44 Given the official start start of the project "Support to local authorities in Gagauzia". March 28, 2018. 
Accessed on April 22, 2019. https://investgagauzia.md/en/page/2/  
45 Gagauzia dialogue 2015–2018: Contributing to the effective functioning of the Gagauzia Autonomy 
within the Republic of Moldova. Accessed on April 23, 2014. http://cmi.fi/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/GagauziaParliamentaryDialogueEnglish.pdf  
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repaired within the frames of Romania`s 20-million-euro grant for Moldova46, while 
Germany has donated state-of-the-art devices for the Gagauz police47.  
In this context, one of the most remarkable but least mentioned nuances is passportization 
led by Romania and Bulgaria. This policy enables the European Union to expand into 
Moldova not territorially but by turning Moldovans into EU citizens. While a big number 
of Moldovans have acquired Romanians passports48, thousands of the Gagauz have 
allegedly become Bulgarian citizens. (Although available also for Romanian citizenship, 
some Gagauz opt not to apply for it perhaps due to the long-time negative attitude towards 
Romania.) Noted only by Sirkeli (2019), the naturalization of the Gagauz by Bulgaria is 
an interesting phenomenon, which should be treated as a separate study. Yet, the author 
faced the lack of information in this field. Nor is there any figure on how many Gagauz 
have been naturalized so far. Official news dating back to 2015 presents an expert view 
that concluded that the Gagauz were Bulgarians of origin and recommended the Bulgarian 
Ministry of Justice to treat the Gagauz equally with other Bulgarians in their citizenship 
applications49. 
Yet, the major obstacle, which has transcended up to date is the LGBT rights. It is one of 
the biggest aspects that alienates the European Union. The attempts of the West to buy 
the Gagauz with several millions have not succeeded and will not succeed, claims Dobrov 
(2019), who is sure that “European super-freedom”, including gay movement does not 
allow the Gagauz to relax and move westward.  
As a result, the following table is generated in this sub-chapter: the main categories are 
summarized for visual understanding of the EU normative power in Gagauz narrative (see 
Table 6). 
                                                          
46 Улучшенные детские сады для детей из сел Молдовы (in Russian). April 14, 2015. Accessed on 
April 22, 2019. https://www.kp.md/daily/26366/3247993/  
47 Посольство Германии предоставило полиции Гагаузии мобильный передвижной центр (in 
Russian). June 18, 2018. Accessed on April 22, 2019. http://nokta.md/reportage/посольство-германии-
предоставило-по/  
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Table 6. EU normative power in Gagauzia 
 
 
 
Role 
 
Opportunity 
Higher standards of development 
Threat 
LGBT values (constructed by Russia) 
Corruption and discrediting of the EU (constructed by 
Moldova) 
 
 
Channels of influence 
 
Open borders (direct experience, contacts) 
EU projects (direct to Gagauzia) 
Reforms  
Passportization (direct experience, contacts) 
 
Local expectations 
 
Higher standards of development 
 
5.5. Gagauzia and Moldova  
Gagauzia`s regional identity and the way how it is shaped will definitely impact the 
situation of Moldova, the nationalizing state in Toal`s model. As a former part of a bigger 
entity, Moldova herself hesitates between the metropolitan state and external normative 
power and must also cope with its uneasy national minority.  
How the parent state is seen to the Gagauz is also controversial and should be scrutinized 
as a distinct research. Moldova is certainly constructed as Other for the Gagauz Self and 
the relationship with Moldova is eyed through the prism of several factors. Firstly, the 
fact that Gagauzia has become part of Moldova is accepted as a result of historical 
developments, at least neutrally, if not negatively.   
And no matter how much we want to live in Russia, it will not work either. It so 
happened historically that this territory is currently called the Republic of 
Moldova and Gagauzia is its integral part. (Patraman, 2019) 
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This position is supplemented by Manjul (2019), who adds that:  
One must understand that there is now a Republic of Moldova. The Republic of 
Moldova also contains the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia. How it 
behaves, where it goes, which course it will take and what happens within 
Moldova is a completely different story. But we are a part of the Republic of 
Moldova. I find it difficult to answer whether it is good or bad. (Manjul, 2019) 
The Gagauz-Moldovan relationship is heavily shaped by Romanophobia, which has 
already been portrayed and explained. Hence, a hypothetical Romanian-Moldovan 
unification, whether it is real or imagined and whether is it on or off the agenda, haunts 
the Gagauz narrative and behavior. The West is also sometimes associated with Romania, 
while Russia and to some extent Turkey are seen protectors for the Gagauz. 
In Moldova, some parasitic politicians have been saying for more than 20 years 
that Moldova needs to reunite with Romania. But the Gagauz suffer and make 
their choice because of it: we do not want to be with Romania, we have to be with 
Russia. These fears, which were invented and inserted into people`s heads like 
chips by politicians. They [those politicians] construct this danger that we can in 
no way go to Europe. (Manjul, 2019) 
What the author himself found very interesting that Moldovan statehood is not only 
constructed as Other, but in some cases even internalized: in this context, Moldovans 
(both politicians and population) are seen as Romanian Other, while Moldova is treated 
as a state of the Gagauz. This argument can be supported by the fact that Moldova`s 
unification with Romania has indeed become impossible so far partly due to the Gagauz 
resistance and Transnistrian problem.  
If their [Moldovan] leaders take them [Moldovans] to Romania tomorrow, they 
will quietly go there and never rebel against it… [B]ut whenever a wave of 
unionism happens, all the Gagauz, regardless of their views, become the patriots 
of Moldova. We do not want Moldova to join somewhere… 
In general, Moldova is fortunate that there are the Gagauz here. Without the 
Gagauz, they would have already been in Romania. Whether it would be better or 
worse is another question. We do not know. But there would have not been an 
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independent Moldova. It would have been incorporated 25 years ago. All 
presidents, both the former ones and the incumbent Dodon, accept that the 
Gagauz are more statists [gosudarstvenniki] than the Moldovans themselves. 
(Dobrov, 2019) (Bold typeface added) 
As seen, the reality of the “other” Other of Romania complicates the picture further. 
Moldova is the Other for the Gagauz in general; but if placed alongside Romania, or when 
the topic of Romanian unification comes up, then Moldova quickly becomes part of the 
Self juxtaposed with Romania. In other words, Self and Other are always relative in this 
region. This narrative is reflected in plural nuances, including the Moldovan vs. 
Romanian language controversy, with most of my interlocutors, copying the general trend 
in Gagauzia, would prefer the notion ‘Moldovan language’ than ‘Romanian’. 
It is no surprise that, the Gagauz electorate which may actually seem small and 
insignicant, is intensively embraced by Moldova`s anti-unionist political figures and 
parties, most notably by the current president, pro-Russian Igor Dodon, who visits 
Gagauzia frequently and with a great pleasure and seems to enjoy sympathy here. 
Despite this internalization of the Moldovan state, the Gagauz generally refer to the 1994 
Autonomy Law that legitimately reserves their right for external self-determination and 
looks as a guarantee against the antagonistic Romanian-Moldovan unification. The 2014 
referendum did also echo and reinforce this legal clause.  
Actually, it was the question that the Gagauz raised in the referendum. In case of 
loss of independence or sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, Gagauzia 
reserves the right... to say goodbye. (Dobrov, 2019) 
While the self-determination paragraph stemmed from the necessity of political realities 
in the mid-1990s to keep the Gagauz out of Romania if Moldova decided to join its 
western neighbor. In the 2010s, the paragraph was also interpreted in terms of Moldova`s 
EU aspirations. Partial loss of Moldova`s sovereignty in case of EU membership, this 
item can be brought into agenda again.  
To a follow-up question, “what would Gagauzia do, should Moldova go westward?”, 
Sirkeli (2019) explains that Gagauzia would also proceed in this direction by inertia as 
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the autonomy does not possess resources to resist. Perhaps an external support might 
change the balance and provide the lacking resources.  
Of course. Gagauzia has no other way out. It all depends on how the Russians will 
counter-act. If they start a strong propaganda... but what’s the difference to the 
Gagauz? They will go anywhere... Everything depends on the support from 
outside. But then again... There is no need to take sharp steps. People would 
certainly resist the unification with Romania. (Sirkeli, 2019) 
As understood, Gagauz narrative of Moldova is not straightforward; by mirroring 
historical experience and present realities, the Gagauz may either detach themselves from 
or attach themselves to Moldova, depending on the Romanian Other context. Although 
the Gagauz may have a say in and occasionally shape Moldova`s domestic and foreign 
policy, they allegedly do not own power for bigger influence. 
 
5.6. Gagauzia`s geopolitical affiliation  
The location of the Gagauz at the border of three geopolitical civilizations shape their 
narratives on identity and regional affiliation.  
According to Sirkeli (2019) and Jekova (2019), the majority of the Gagauz would 
associate themselves with the Russian world.  
Gagauzia is not a part of Romanian, European or Turkic world. It is rather a post-
Soviet, Eurasian and pro-Russian entity. The Gagauz feel part of the Russian 
world, Russian culture. And the referendum of 2014 was mostly about it. 90% 
were in favor of the Eurasian Union. (Sirkeli, 2019) 
Dobrov (2019) goes even further and alerts that Gagauzia is already Russian.  
I say to the Turks: “What are you doing? Why are you erecting these huge 
buildings for the Russian Gagauz? You are building them pro bono for Russia, for 
a Russian Gagauzia.” (Dobrov, 2019) 
The other point of view promotes the idea that the Gagauz rather belong to the Turkic 
world. Saying this, Taushanji (2019) brings attention to the unique position of the Gagauz 
within the Turkic realm:  
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We will stay as a part of the Turkic world. We are Turks, Orthodox. Uniqueness. 
An exception. We are the only people who have an exclusive destiny… We must 
preserve this identity and fight for it. (Taushanji, 2019) 
Jekova (2019) asserts that being Turkic is a great asset for the Gagauz, but this identity is 
not developed by pro-Russian politicians: 
I consider that this is a great asset for us. That we are not a small Gagauz people, 
but a part of the Turkic world. I think that politicians do not want to use this card, 
because, in general, they know little about what the Turkic world means. And it is 
a shame. (Taushanji, 2019) 
But both Taushanji (2019) and Jekova (2019), along with Patraman (2019), Dobrov 
(2019) and Dragoy (2019), accept the dual nature of the Gagauz: that this small 
community is partly Turkic and partly Russian. Dobrov (2019) also confirms this dual 
ideological affiliation but explains that it is constructed on a personal level:  
Almost all adult women have been to and worked in Turkey. They feel part of the 
Turkic world. Almost all men have worked in Russia. They feel part of the Russian 
world. (Dobrov, 2019) 
This dual nature, in the author`s opinion, was best described by Taushanji (2019):  
Russia is our father, Turkey our mother. We suck [milk of] our mother and obey 
our father. (Taushanji, 2019) 
With the EU`s entering the Gagauz scene, the issue of ideological and regional affiliation 
is becoming more intricate. As Sirkeli (2019) explains, such affiliation should and will 
be constructed by actions rather than through narratives. The improvement of life 
standards, economic development and reforms can build a positive European narrative 
and bring Gagauzia closer to the West.  
In the opinion of Jekova (2019), the question of Gagauzia`s affiliation is constructed by 
politicians and becomes sharper in the eve of and during elections. Thus, different vectors 
of foreign policy and of development are contradicted as part of election campaigns and 
for political gains.  
 
80 
 
6. Conclusion 
This thesis aims to explore how the Gagauz elite constructs the autonomy`s regional 
identity vis-à-vis external geopolitical ideologies. The reflection of the influence and 
competition of three geopolitical ideologies, Russian world, Pan-Turkism and EU 
normative power, in Gagauzia is examined through analysis of elitar narrative. Analysing 
what components constitute contemporary Gagauz regional identity, how each 
geopolitical ideology is constructed (whether as an advantage or threat), which channels 
of influence each has, what local expectations tell may indirectly reveal regional / 
geopolitical / ideological affiliation of the present political, intellectual and cultural elite 
in Gagauzia. How this geopolitical struggle may also affect Moldova, Gagauzia`s parent 
state, is also reviewed in the research.  
As a small self-governing entity, which is by no means wealthy, Gagauzia seeks outside 
support and money, mainly from Russia, Turkey and the European Union. This way, the 
autonomy has long been a recipient of soft power emanated by the core entities of the 
studied geopolitical ideologies.  
The Russian influence in Gagauzia is strong and obvious, based on the historically 
positive Russian image in the eyes of the Gagauz. This friendship has further been 
cemented by shared legacy (Soviet nostalgia) in the region. Heavily Russified during the 
Soviet time, many Gagauz have, thus, been brought up pro-Russian. The current dominant 
status of Russian in all spheres of life, including education, further fosters Russianness in 
the region. Therefore, the Gagauz are easy target for Russian mass and social media. Yet, 
as many interviewees admit that the Gagauz-Russian relations have been mostly a one-
sided road, as less than expected attention and aid have come from Russia so far.  
Turkey, the flagship of Pan-Turkic ideology, has undertaken serious steps to gain a 
foothold in the region, based on a common ethno-linguistic background. Since the 1990s, 
Turkish party has invested a great deal in Gagauzia: therefore, Turkish soft power is based 
on developmental aid and investments (mainly infrastructure construction), as well as on 
educational and cultural initiatives. Frequent visits by Turkish officials also underline 
Turkey`s serious interest in Gagauzia. The local expectations form Turkey is related 
mainly to the revival of the fading Gagauz language. 
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Gagauzia`s pre-2014 extremely negative picture of the European Union, has been 
changing recently, as several interlocutors claim. The EU also enters the region with its 
projects and open borders, as well as policies of individual states (such as citizenship): 
these efforts, especially growing direct European experience in Gagauzia and multi-
million developmental programmes funded by the EU, stimulate a more positive image 
of the latter in the autonomy. Although the EU is associated with higher level of 
development and better life standards, some negativity in the local narrative still remains 
due to collision between Gagauz traditional lifestyle and EU-promoted gay rights.  
To summarize, we can conclude that in Gagauzia: 
• Russian influence is inertially maintained by the dominance of the Russian 
language and Soviet nostalgia; 
• Active in infrastructure building and culture, Turkey emphasizes ethno-linguistic 
brotherhood; 
• The EU gradually enters Gagauzia indirectly (via Moldova) and directly 
(developmental projects).  
Transnational labor also contributes to the construction of the regional identity: numerous 
Gagauz migrant workers may affiliate themselves with and be subject to the influence of 
the studied powers (Russia, Turkey, the EU) and bring back to Gagauzia the elements 
from those powers:  incorporated into Gagauz identity on a personal level, these elements 
add  complexity to a larger compound of Gagauz narrative.  
The regional / geopolitical / ideological affiliation of Gagauzia currently has a dual nature: 
Russian and Turkic, with the former allegedly weighing a little more. With the advance 
of the EU into Gagauzia, the affiliation issue seems to become more complicated. Thus, 
the autonomy is forced to take into account geopolitical ambitions of each of these 
external actors.  While the sentiments articulated during the elite interviews point to 
attempts to construct/preserve a distinct identity, the elite`s narratives generalize how the 
Gagauz may share with Russia language and historical connections by belonging to 
Russian-language information space and glorifying the Soviet era, feel part of the bigger 
Turkic world by mythologizing their ancient roots and embracing Turkey`s infrastructure 
projects, and positivize the EU image and accept the EU`s advance into the region by 
eagerly receiving financial support and various programmes from the European Union. 
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Gagauzia’s status as an integral, yet autonomous province of Moldova may present its 
own unique set of problems. Since the autonomy was formalized in the mid-1990s, 
Gagauzia has been maintaining uneasy relations with Chişinau, especially in the context 
of the devolution of competencies, foreign policy priorities and historical Romanophobia 
in Gagauz narrative. At the same time, the region does not possess ample political and 
economic power to be able to shape the policies of the Republic of Moldova. Neither does 
it have any resources to secede and become an independent state without an outside 
interference. Therefore, from time to time Gagauz political forces may either play the 
self-determination card, be the main supporters of the Moldovan statehood or see Russia 
and Turkey as protectors against possible Moldovan-Romanian unification.  
This study generated original data based on the narratives of the local elite from a small 
and understudied region. Nevertheless, this analysis adds only a small puzzle into a larger 
Gagauz mosaic, which is treated as a single case due to the peculiar nature and conditions 
of the area. As Gagauzia’s outsized geopolitical importance will remain for the next few 
years, further research may facilitate a better understanding of the region, which sits at 
the crossroads of civilizations, Russian world, Pan-Turkism and EU normative power, 
and of the construction of Gagauz regional identity narratives vis-à-vis these geopolitical 
ideologies. 
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Appendix 1. List of interviewees 
Mihail Sirkeli (Civil society activist, journalist, director of a local non-governmental 
organization). February 5, 2019. Comrat, Gagauzia 
Ludmila Ibrishim (Lecturer, Dean of the Faculty of National Culture at Comrat State 
University). February 6, 2019. Comrat, Gagauzia 
Todur Zanet (Journalist, folklorist and poet. Editor-in-chief of the first and only 
Gagauz-language newspaper). February 7, 2019. Comrat, Gagauzia 
Ivan Patraman (Theater and film actor. Director and producer of the first Gagauz-
language film). February 10, 2019. Comrat, Gagauzia 
Konstantin Taushanji (Economist, Dean of Comrat State University, national movement 
activist, ex-mayor of Comrat). February 12, 2019. Comrat, Gagauzia 
Ekaterina Jekova (Journalist, ex-chair of Gagauz Radio and Television, Member of 
Halk Topluşu, the regional parliament). February 13, 2019. Comrat, Gagauzia 
Vladimir Kissa (Chairman of Halk Topluşu, the regional parliament). February 14, 
2019. Comrat, Gagauzia 
Leonid Dobrov (Civil society activist, national movement activist, Soviet-time 
dissenter, ex-mayor of Comrat). February 16, 2019. Comrat, Gagauzia 
Vitali Dragoy (Doctor, Deputy Director of the National Prehospital Emergency Center, 
Member of Halk Topluşu, the regional parliament). February 16, 2019. Comrat, 
Gagauzia 
Vitali Manjul (Singer, composer and painter). February 17, 2019. Comrat, Gagauzia 
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Appendix 2. Interview questions (originally in Russian) 
1. What is the current situation with the Gagauz language and culture? How much does 
territorial autonomy support them and help them to survive?  
(Какова нынешняя ситуация с гагаузским языком и культурой? Насколько 
территориальная автономия поддерживает их и помогает им выживать?) 
2. How do the Gagauz feel the Russian influence? How do they evaluate it (as a threat or 
advantage)?  
(Насколько гагаузы чувствуют российское влияние? Как они это оценивают (как 
угрозу или преимущество)?) 
3. How much have Turkey and Turkish language been influencing Gagauzia? How does 
Turkish soft power reflect in Gagauzia (construction? Media?)  
(Насколько Турция и турецкий язык влияют на Гагаузию? Как в Гагаузии 
отражается турецкая мягкая сила (строительство? СМИ?)  
4. Moldova has signed an agreement with the EU and openly looks to the West. How do 
Gagauz perceive it? What is their imagination of the EU?  
(Молдова подписала соглашение с ЕС и открыто смотрит на Запад. Как гагаузы 
воспринимают это? Какие у них представление о ЕС?) 
5. How do Gagauz perceive their regional affiliation? As part of Moldova? Romanian 
space? West? Russian world? Post-Soviet space? Eurasian world? Or the Turkic world?  
(Как гагаузы воспринимают свою региональную принадлежность? Как часть 
Молдовы? Румынского пространства? Запада? Русского мира? Пост-советского 
prostranstva? Евразийского мира? Или тюркского мира?) 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Appendix 3. Map of Moldova 
 
(Source: Centre for Eastern Studies50) 
                                                          
50 Gagauzia: growing separatism in Moldova? March 10, 2014. Accessed on March 10, 2019. 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-10/gagauzia-growing-separatism-
moldova 
